



When the Sky is Falling

Network-Scale Mitigation of High-Volume Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attacks

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
Introduction & Context

DDoS Background

What is a **D**istributed **D**enial **o**f **S**ervice (DDoS) attack?


- An attempt to consume finite resources, exploit weaknesses in software design or implementation, or exploit lack of infrastructure capacity
- Targets the availability and utility of computing and network resources
- Attacks are almost always distributed for even more significant effect (i.e., DDoS)
- The collateral damage caused by an attack can be as bad, if not worse, than the attack itself
- DDoS attacks affect availability! No availability, no applications/services/ data/Internet! No revenue!
- DDoS attacks are attacks against capacity and/or state!

Three Security Characteristics



The goal of security is to maintain these three characteristics

Three Security Characteristics



 The primary goal of DDoS defense is maintaining availability in the face of attack

Almost All Security Spending/Effort is Focused on Confidentiality & Integrity

- Confidentiality and integrity are relatively simple concepts, easy for non-specialists to understand
- In practice, confidentiality and integrity pretty much equate to encryption again, easy for non-specialists to understand
- The reality is that there's more to them than encryption, but it's easy to proclaim victory - "We have anti-virus, we have disk encryption, we're PCI-compliant, woo-hoo!"
- And yet, hundreds of millions of botted hosts; enterprise networks of all sizes in all verticals completely penetrated, intellectual property stolen, defense secrets leaked, et. al.
- Availability can't be finessed the Web server/DNS server/VoIP PBX is either up or it's down. No way to obfuscate/overstate/prevaricate with regards to actual, realworld security posture.
- Availability requires operational security (opsec) practitioners who understand TCP/IP and routing/switching; who understand Web servers; who understand DNS servers; who understand security; who understand layer-7.
- These people are rare, and they don't come cheaply. Most organizations don't even understand the required skillsets and experiential scope to look for in order to identify and hire the right folks

Availability is Hard!

- Maintaining availability in the face of attack requires a combination of skills, architecture, operational agility, analytical capabilities, and mitigation capabilities which most organizations simply do not possess
- In practice, most organizations never take availability into account when designing/speccing/building/deploying/testing online apps/services/properties
- In practice, most organizations never make the logical connection between maintaining availability and business continuity
- In practice, most organizations never stress-test their apps/ services stacks in order to determine scalability/resiliency shortcomings and proceed to fix them
- In practice, most organizations do not have plans for DDoS mitigation - or if they have a plan, they never rehearse it!

Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attacks

Evolution of Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attacks

- Many varieties of reflection/amplification DDoS attacks have been observed 'in the wild' for 18 years or more.
- Beginning in October of 2013, high-profile NTP reflection/ amplification DDoS attacks were launched against various online gaming services.
- With tens of millions of simultaneous users affected, these attacks were reported in the mainstream tech press.
- But these attacks aren't new the largest observed DDoS attacks are all reflection/amplification attacks, and have been for years.
- Reflection/amplification attacks require the ability to spoof the IP address of the intended target.
- In most volumetric DDoS attacks, throughput (pps) is more important that bandwidth (bps). In most reflection/amplification DDoS attacks, bps is more important than pps – it fills the pipes!

Components of a Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack

Amplification


 Attacker makes a relatively small request that generates a significantly-larger response/reply. This is true of most (not all) server responses.


Reflection


 Attacker sends spoofed requests to a large number of Internet connected devices, which reply to the requests.
 Using IP address spoofing, the 'source' address is set to the actual target of the attack, where all replies are sent.
 Many services can be exploited to act as reflectors.


Impact of Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attacks


- Servers, services, applications, Internet access, et. al. on the target network overwhelmed and rendered unavailable by sheer traffic volume – tens or hundreds of gb/sec frequent.
- Complete saturation of peering links/transit links of the target network.
- Total or near-total saturation of peering links/transit links/core links of intermediate networks between the reflectors/amplifiers and the target network – including the networks of direct peers/ transit providers of the target network
- Widespread collateral damage packet loss, delays, high latency for Internet traffic of uninvolved parties which simply happens to traverse networks saturated by these attacks.
- Unavailability of servers/services/applications, Internet access for bystanders topologically proximate to the target network.











The Two Main Factors Which Make These Attacks Possible

- Failure to deploy source-address validation
 (e.g., anti-spoofing) mechanisms such as
 Unicast Reverse-Path Forwarding (uRPF), ACLs,
 DHCP Snooping & IP Source Guard, Cable IP
 Source Verify, ACLs, etc. on all edges of ISP and
 enterprise networks.
- Misconfigured, abusable services running on servers, routers, switches, home CPE devices, etc.

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
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 Misconfigured, abusable services running on servers, routers, switches, home CPE devices, etc.

Growth of DDoS Attack Volumes, 2002 - 2014

Virtually *all* growth in DDoS attack volume over the last 12 years is due to the rise in popularity of reflection/amplification DDoS attack methodologies.

Survey Peak Attack Size Year Over Year



The ability to spoof traffic is *required* in order to launch reflection/amplification DDoS attacks.

Additional Contributing Factors

- Failure of network operators to utilize flow telemetry (e.g., NetFlow, cflowd/jflow, et. al.) collection and analysis for attack detection/classification/traceback.
- Failure of ISPs and enterprises to proactively scan for and remediate abusable services on their networks and to scan for and alert customers/users running abusable services – blocking abusable services until they are remediated, if necessary.
- Failure to deploy and effectively utilize DDoS reaction/mitigation tools such as Source-Based Remotely-Triggered Blackholing (S/RTBH), flowspec, and Intelligent DDoS Mitigation Systems (IDMSes).
- Failure to fund and prioritize availability equally with confidentiality and integrity in the security sphere.
- Failure of many enterprises/ASPs to subscribe to 'Clean Pipes' DDoS mitigation services offered by ISPs/MSSPs.

What Types of Devices Are Being Abused?

- Consumer broadband customer premise equipment
 (CPE) devices e.g., home broadband routers/modems with
 insecure (and sometimes insecurable!) factor default settings
- Commercial-grade provider equipment (PE) devices –
 e.g., larger, more powerful routers and layer-3 switches
 used by ISPs and enterprises
- Servers (real or virtual) running misconfigured, abusable service daemons home servers set up by end-users, commercial servers set up by ISPs and enterprises.
- **Embedded devices** like network-connected printers (!), DVRs, et. al.
- The Internet of Things is rapidly becoming the Botnet of Things!

Reflection/Amplification Attack Terminology

- Attack source origination point of spoofed attack packets.
- Reflector nodes through which spoofed attack packets are 'reflected' to the attack target and/or to a separate amplifier node prior to reflection to the target.
- Amplifier nodes which receives non-spoofed attack packets from reflector nodes and then generate significantly larger response packets, which are sent back to the reflectors.
- Reflector/Amplifier nodes which performs both the reflection and amplification of attack packets, and then transmit the nonspoofed, amplified responses to the ultimate target of the attack. Many (not all) reflection/amplification attacks work this way.
- Attack leg the distinct logical path elements which attack traffic traverses on the way from the attack source to reflectors/ amplifiers, and from reflectors/amplifiers to the attack target.

Spoofed vs. Non-spoofed Traffic

- Attack source reflector/amplifier source IP addresses are spoofed. The attacker spoofs the IP address of the ultimate target of the attack.
- If separate reflectors and amplifiers are involved, the traffic from the reflector to the amplifier is not spoofed, the traffic from the amplifier back to the reflector is not spoofed, and the traffic from the reflector to the attack target is not spoofed.
- If combined reflectors/amplifiers are involved, the traffic from the reflectors/amplifiers to the attack target is not spoofed.
- This means that the attack target sees the real IP addresses of the attack traffic pummeling it on the ultimate leg of the attack.
- This fact has significant positive implications for the mitigation options available to the attack target – but the sheer number of source IPs is often a complicating factor.

Five Common Reflection/Amplification Vectors

- chargen 30-year-old tool for testing network link integrity and performance. Seldom (ever?) used these days for its original intended purpose. Senselessly, absurdly implemented in the modern age by clueless embedded device vendors.
- **DNS** the Domain Name System resolves human-friendly names into IP addresses. Part of the 'control-plane' of the Internet. No DNS = no Internet.
- SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol. Used to monitor and optionally configure network infrastructure devices, services, etc.
- NTP Network Time Protocol provides timesync services for your routers/switches/laptops/tablets/phones/etc. The most important Internet service you've never heard of.
- **SSDP** Simple Services Discovery Protocol acts as a poorly designed-and-implemented services enumeration system for the poorly-designed-and-implemented UPnP.

Reflection/Amplification Isn't Limited to These Five Vectors

- Many protocols/services can be leveraged by attackers to launch reflection/amplification DDoS attacks.
- These five— DNS, chargen, SNMP, SSDP, and NTP are commonly-observed reflection/amplification vectors.
- Most (not all) reflection/amplification attacks utilize UDP.
- The same general principles discussed with regards to these five vectors apply to others, as well.
- There are protocol-/service-specific differences which also apply.
- Attackers are investigating and actively utilizing other reflection/amplification vectors, as well – be prepared!

Five Common Reflection/Amplification Vectors

Abbreviation	Protocol	Ports	Amplification Factor	# Abusable Servers
CHARGEN	Char acter Gen eration Protocol	UDP / 19	18x/1000x	Tens of thousands (90K)
DNS	D omain N ame S ystem	UDP / 53	160x	Millions (27M)
NTP	Network Time Protocol	UDP / 123	1000x	Over One Hundred Thousand (119K)
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol	UDP / 161	880x	Millions (5M)
SSDP	Simple Service Discovery Protocol	UDP /1900	20x/83x	Millions (2M)

NTP Reflection/Amplification

Amplification Factor - NTP

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Characteristics of an NTP Reflection/Amplification Attack

- The attacker **spoofs** the IP address of the target of the attack, sends *monlist*, *showpeers*, or other NTP level-6/-7 administrative queries to multiple abusable NTP services running on servers, routers, home CPE devices, etc.
- The attacker chooses the UDP port which he'd like to target – typically, UDP/80 or UDP/123, but it can be any port of the attacker's choice – and uses that as the source port. The destination port is UDP/123.
- The NTP services 'reply' to the attack target with non-spoofed streams of ~468-byte packets sourced from UDP/123 to the target; the destination port is the source port the attacker chose when generating the NTP monlist/showpeers/etc. queries.

Characteristics of an NTP Reflection/Amplification Attack (cont.)

- As these multiple streams of non-spoofed NTP replies converge, the attack volume can be huge the largest verified attack of this type so far is over 300gb/sec.
 100gb/sec attacks are commonplace.
- Due to sheer attack volume, the *Internet transit* bandwidth of the target, along with core bandwidth of the
 target's peers/upstreams, as well as the core bandwidth of
 intermediary networks between the various NTP services
 being abused and the target, is *saturated* with *non-spoofed* attack traffic.
- In most attacks, between ~4,000 ~7,000 abusable NTP services are leveraged by attackers. Up to 50,000 NTP services have been observed in some attacks.

NTP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology



Abusable NTP Servers


Internet-Accessible Servers, Routers, Home CPE devices, etc.





172.19.234.6/32

NTP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology



172.19.234.6/32

NTP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology



Non-Spoofed Sources: Multiple NTP Servers

Destination: 172.19.234.6


Reply: Up to 500 packets of *monlist* replies





172.19.234.6/32


NTP Reflection/Amplification Attack




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



NTP Reflection/Amplification Attack












Affected Routers							
			Obs	served bps	Obse	erved pps	
	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall	Details
Router	High	1.00 Kpps	9.16 Gbps	4.24 Gbps	2.45 Mpps	1.13 Mpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 120) xe-0/0/0.22		-	9.16 Gbps	4.24 Gbps	2.45 Mpps	1.13 Mpps	<u>Details</u>
Router	High	1.00 Kpps	5.52 Gbps	2.60 Gbps	1.48 Mpps	695.88 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 516) xe-4/0/1.386		-	2.50 Mbps	2.40 Mbps	666.00 pps	641.67 pps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 518) xe-5/0/1.584		-	2.23 Gbps	1.05 Gbps	594.90 Kpps	280.40 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 521) xe-5/1/0.106		-	1.13 Gbps	693.04 Mbps	301.08 Kpps	185.48 Kpps	Details
Interface (SNMP 584) xe-4/0/0.104	b	-	2.17 Gbps	1.12 Gbps	580.42 Kpps	298.98 Kpps	Details

Annotations

Add Comment

Escalated

This alert has been escalated to the security group and mitigated efficiently!



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
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Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall	petails
High	1.00 Kpps	9.16 Gbps	4.24 Gbps	2.45 Mpps	1.13 Mpps	Details
	-	9.16 Gbps	4.24 Gbps	2.45 Mpps	1.13 Mpps	<u>Details</u>
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	-	2.50 Mbps	2.40 Mbps	666.00 pps	641.67 pps	<u>Details</u>
	-	2.23 Gbps	1.05 Gbps	594.90 Kpps	280.40 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
	-	1.13 Gbps	693.04 Mbps	301.08 Kpps	185.48 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
*	-	2.17 Gbps	1.12 Gbps	580.42 Kpps	298.98 Kpps	Details
	High High	High 1.00 Kpps - High 1.00 Kpps	Severity Level Expected Max	High 1.00 Kpps 9.16 Gbps 4.24 Gbps - 9.16 Gbps 4.24 Gbps High 1.00 Kpps 5.52 Gbps 2.60 Gbps - 2.50 Mbps 2.40 Mbps - 2.23 Gbps 1.05 Gbps - 1.13 Gbps 693.04 Mbps	Severity Level Expected Max Overall Max High 1.00 Kpps 9.16 Gbps 4.24 Gbps 2.45 Mpps - 9.16 Gbps 4.24 Gbps 2.45 Mpps High 1.00 Kpps 5.52 Gbps 2.60 Gbps 1.48 Mpps - 2.50 Mbps 2.40 Mbps 666.00 pps - 2.23 Gbps 1.05 Gbps 594.90 Kpps - 1.13 Gbps 693.04 Mbps 301.08 Kpps	Severity Level Expected Max Overall Max Overall High 1.00 Kpps 9.16 Gbps 4.24 Gbps 2.45 Mpps 1.13 Mpps - 9.16 Gbps 4.24 Gbps 2.45 Mpps 1.13 Mpps High 1.00 Kpps 5.52 Gbps 2.60 Gbps 1.48 Mpps 695.88 Kpps - 2.50 Mbps 2.40 Mbps 666.00 pps 641.67 pps - 2.23 Gbps 1.05 Gbps 594.90 Kpps 280.40 Kpps - 1.13 Gbps 693.04 Mbps 301.08 Kpps 185.48 Kpps

Annotations

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
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Affected Network Flements

			Obser	ved bps	Observ	ved pps
Network Element	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall
Router	high	1.00 kpps	9.16 G	4.24 G	2.45 M	1.13 M



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			Obser	ved bps	Observ	ed pps
Network Element	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall
Router	high	1.00 kpps	9.16 G	4.24 G	2.45 M	1.13 M

ID	Importance	Impact	Duration	Start Time	Direction	Type	Resource
.064808	High 32,279.9% Of 8.0 Kpps	15.61 Gbps 4.17 Mpps	0:24 (Ended)	Thu, Feb 27 2014, 20:49:34	Incoming	UDP (Misuse)	ntp amplified attack traf / ntp amplified attack traf
pps		: :	pps of affec	ted elements for alert 10648	08		Thu Feb 27 2014
2.5 M	-						
2 M							
1.5 M		A			В.		
1М	Ъ		B B	В		B	
0.5 M		8					
ом	2053 2054 2055 20	056 2057 2058	2059 21:00	2]01 2]02 2]03 2]04 2]0	5 2106 2107	2108 2109	21:10 21:11 21:12

Affected Network Elements							
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Router	high	1.00 kpps	9.16 G	4.24 G	2.45 M	1.13 M	

Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
/32 ?		667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	
Source Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
ntp (123)	udp (17)	667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	✓
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
http (80)	udp (17)	619.52 G	1.32 G	467.87	3.94 G	1.05 M	92.80	✓
0 - 127	udp (17)	1.40 M	3.00 k	468.00	8.92 k	2.38	0.00	
IP Protocol								
IP Protocol		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter

Address/Mask 📶		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
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IP Protocol								
		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
Туре 🔟		bytes		,	•			

Destination Addresses								
Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
/32 ?		667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	
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ort Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
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IP Protocol								
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Type III								

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Туре								

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ıdp (17)			107.07	3.34 0	1.05 14	92.80	
	1.40 M	3.00 k	468.00	8.92 k	2.38	0.00	
k	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
	667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	⋖
ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
120	667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	☑
ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
124	522.34 G	1.12 G	467.77	3.32 G	886.95 k	78.26	⋖
157	113.86 G	243.38 M	467.82	723.49 M	193.31 k	17.06	
	ifIndex 120 ifIndex 124	ifIndex Bytes 120 667.44 G ifIndex Bytes 124 522.34 G	ifIndex Bytes Packets 120 667.44 G 1.43 G ifIndex Bytes Packets 124 522.34 G 1.12 G	ifIndex Bytes Packets Bytes/Pkt 120 667.44 G 1.43 G 467.77 ifIndex Bytes Packets Bytes/Pkt 124 522.34 G 1.12 G 467.77	ifIndex Bytes Packets Bytes/Pkt bps 120 667.44 G 1.43 G 467.77 4.24 G ifIndex Bytes Packets Bytes/Pkt bps 124 522.34 G 1.12 G 467.77 3.32 G	ifIndex Bytes Packets Bytes/Pkt bps pps 120 667.44 G 1.43 G 467.77 4.24 G 1.13 M ifIndex Bytes Packets Bytes/Pkt bps pps 124 522.34 G 1.12 G 467.77 3.32 G 886.95 k	ifIndex Bytes Packets Bytes/Pkt bps pps % pps 120 667.44 G 1.43 G 467.77 4.24 G 1.13 M 100.00 ifIndex Bytes Packets Bytes/Pkt bps pps % pps 124 522.34 G 1.12 G 467.77 3.32 G 886.95 k 78.26

ttp (80)	udp (17)	619.52 G	1.32 G	467.87	3.94 G	1.05 M	92.80	✓
ttp (80)	udp (17)							
) - 127	udp (17)	1.40 M	3.00 k	468.00	8.92 k	2.38	0.00	
P Protocol								
ype III	k	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
dp (17)		667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	
ngress Interfaces								
lame 📶	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
e-0/0/0.22	120	667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	
gress Interfaces								
lame 📶	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
re-0/0/0.32	124	522.34 G	1.12 G	467.77	3.32 G	886.95 k	78.26	
			243.38 M	467.82	723.49 M	193.31 k	17.06	⋖

		-,		-,,	-1			
http (80)	udp (17)	619.52 G	1.32 G	467.87	3.94 G	1.05 M	92.80	
0 - 127	udp (17)	1.40 M	3.00 k	468.00	8.92 k	2.38	0.00	
IP Protocol								
Туре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	✓
Ingress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-0/0/0.22	120	667.44 G	1.43 G	467.77	4.24 G	1.13 M	100.00	⋖
Egress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-0/0/0.32	124	522.34 G	1.12 G	467.77	3.32 G	886.95 k	78.26	⋖
xe-0/0/0.20	157	113.86 G	243.38 M	467.82	723.49 M	193.31 k	17.06	\checkmark
For assistance with this p	product please contact	support@arbor	networks com					A

DNS Reflection/Amplification

Amplification Factor - DNS

Abbreviation	Protocol	Ports	Amplification Factor	# Abusable Servers
CHARGEN	Character Generation Protocol	UDP / 19	18x/1000x	Tens of thousands (90K)
DNS	Domain Name System	UDP / 53	160x	Millions (27M)
NTP	Network Time Protocol	UDP / 123	1000x	Over One Hundred Thousand (119K)
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol	UDP / 161	880x	Millions (5M)
SSDP	Simple Service Discovery Protocol	UDP /1900	20x/83x	Millions (2M)

Characteristics of a DNS Reflection/Amplification Attack

- The attacker spoofs the IP address of the target of the attack, sending DNS queries for pre-identified large DNS records (ANY records, large TXT records, etc.) either to abusable open DNS recursive servers, or directly to authoritative DNS servers.
- The attacker chooses the UDP port which he'd like to target with DNS, this is typically limited to either UDP/53 or UDP/1024-65535 The destination port is UDP/53
- The servers 'reply' either directly to the attack target or to the intermediate open DNS recursive server with large DNS responses – the attack target will see streams of unsolicited DNS responses broken down into initial and non-initial fragments.
- Response sizes are typically 4096 8192 bytes (can be smaller or larger), broken down into multiple fragments.
- Packet sizes received by the attack target are generally ~1500 bytes due to prevalent Ethernet MTUs – and there are lots of them.


Characteristics of a DNS Reflection/Amplification Attack (cont.)


- As these multiple streams of fragmented DNS responses converge, the attack volume can be huge – the largest verified attack of this type so far is ~200gb/sec. 100gb/sec attacks are commonplace.
- Internet transit bandwidth of the target, along with core bandwidth of the target's peers/upstreams, as well as the core bandwidth of intermediary networks between the various DNS services being abused and the target, are saturated.
- In most attacks involving intermediate open DNS recursive servers are reflectors, between ~20,000 – 30,000 abusable recursive DNS are leveraged by attackers. Up to 50,000 abusable open recursive DNS servers have been observed in some attacks.
- In attacks leveraging authoritative DNS servers directly, hundreds or thousands of these servers are utilized by attackers.
- Many well-known authoritative DNS servers are anycasted, with multiple instances deployed around the Internet.













Authoritative DNS Servers for example.com



Abusable Recursive DNS Servers


Internet-Accessible Servers, Routers, Home CPE devices, etc.








Authoritative DNS Servers for example.com






UDP/various— UDP/53, ~70 bytes Non-Spoofed Sources: Multiple Recursive DNS Servers Destinations: Multiple Authoritative DNS servers DNS query: TXT PGP.EXAMPLE.COM









Abusable Recursive DNS Servers


UDP/53 – UDP/various, ~8192 bytes, fragmented Non-Spoofed Sources: Multiple Authoritative DNS Servers DNS Response: TXT RR for PGP.EXAMPLE.COM





























Affected Routers Observed bps Observed pps **Severity Level Expected** Max Overall Max Overall **Details** High 5.00 Kpps 326.82 Mbps 168.71 Mbps 32.73 Kpps 16.88 Kpps Details Interface (SNMP 516) xe-4/0/1.386 4.59 Mbps 433.00 pps 3.21 Mbps 305.56 pps Details Interface (SNMP 518) xe-5/0/1.584 4.33 Mbps 2.95 Mbps 516.00 pps 366.67 pps **Details** terface (SNMP 521) xe-5/1/0.106 203.42 Mbps 101.67 Mbps 20.15 Kpps 10.10 Kpps **Details** Interface (SNMP 584) xe-4/0/0.104 83.22 Mbps 114.55 Mbps 11.63 Kpps 8.37 Kpps **Details**

Annotations



Escalated

This alert has been escalated to the security group and mitigated efficiently!

Affected Routers

			Obse	erved bps	Obse	erved pps	
	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall	Details
Router	High	5.00 Kpps	326.82 Mbps	168.71 Mbps	32.73 Kpps	16.88 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 516) xe-4/0/1.386		-	4.59 Mbps	3.21 Mbps	433.00 pps	305.56 pps	<u>Qetails</u>
Interface (SNMP 518) xe-5/0/1.584		-	4.33 Mbps	2.95 Mbps	516.00 pps	366.67 pps	Details
Interface (SNMP 521) xe-5/1/0.106		-	203.42 Mbps	101.67 Mbps	20.15 Kpps	10.10 Kpps	Details
Interface (SNMP 584) xe-4/0/0.104		-	114.55 Mbps	83.22 Mbps	11.63 Kpps	8.37 Kpps	<u>Details</u>

Annotations





Escalated

This alert has been escalated to the security group and mitigated efficiently!

DoS Alert 1077616 Traffic Details







Source Addresses

Address/Mask	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
80.0.0.0/8 ?	997.64 M	826.00 k	1.21 k	33.25 M	3.44 k	20.40	⋖
80.240.0.0/12 ?	888.50 M	705.00 k	1.26 k	29.62 M	2.94 k	17.41	✓
80.64.0.0/11 ?	888.15 M	647.00 k	1.37 k	29.60 M	2.70 k	15.98	✓
80.64.0.0/10 ?	438.96 M	385.00 k	1.14 k	14.63 M	1.60 k	9.51	✓
80.128.0.0/9 ?	359.47 M	265.00 k	1.36 k	11.98 M	1.10 k	6.54	✓
80.80.0.0/12 ?	344.24 M	256.00 k	1.34 k	11.47 M	1.07 k	6.32	⋖
80.48.0.0/13 ?	350.93 M	247.00 k	1.42 k	11.70 M	1.03 k	6.10	✓
80.12.0.0/14 ?	251.94 M	246.00 k	1.02 k	8.40 M	1.02 k	6.07	✓
0.0.0.0/0 ?	276.77 M	241.00 k	1.15 k	9.23 M	1.00 k	5.95	✓
60.0.0.0/10 ?	264.85 M	232.00 k	1.14 k	8.83 M	966.67	5.73	

Source Addresses

Addr ss/Mask	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
80 0.0.0/8 <u>?</u>	997.64 M	826.00 k	1.21 k	33.25 M	3.44 k	20.40	⋖
0.240.0.0/12 <u>?</u>	888.50 M	705.00 k	1.26 k	29.62 M	2.94 k	17.41	
80.64.0.0/11 <u>?</u>	888.15 M	647.00 k	1.37 k	29.60 M	2.70 k	15.98	
80.64.0.0/10 <u>?</u>	438.96 M	385.00 k	1.14 k	14.63 M	1.60 k	9.51	
80.128.0.0/9 <u>?</u>	359.47 M	265.00 k	1.36 k	11.98 M	1.10 k	6.54	
80.80.0.0/12 <u>?</u>	344.24 M	256.00 k	1.34 k	11.47 M	1.07 k	6.32	
80.48.0.0/13 <u>?</u>	350.93 M	247.00 k	1.42 k	11.70 M	1.03 k	6.10	
80.12.0.0/14 <u>?</u>	251.94 M	246.00 k	1.02 k	8.40 M	1.02 k	6.07	
0.0.0.0/0 <u>?</u>	276.77 M	241.00 k	1.15 k	9.23 M	1.00 k	5.95	⋖
60.0.0.0/10 <u>?</u>	264.85 M	232.00 k	1.14 k	8.83 M	966.67	5.73	

Address/Mask 🔟	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
80.0.0.0/8 ?	997.64 M	826.00 k	1.21 k	33.25 M	3.44 k	20.40	⋖
80.240.0.0/12 ?	888.50 M	705.00 k	1.26 k	29.62 M	2.94 k	17.41	⋖
80.64.0.0/11 ?	888.15 M	647.00 k	1.37 k	29.60 M	2.70 k	15.98	\checkmark
80.64.0.0/10 ?	438.96 M	385.00 k	1.14 k	14.63 M	1.60 k	9.51	⋖
80.128.0.0/9 <u>?</u>	359.47 M	265.00 k	1.36 k	11.98 M	1.10 k	6.54	\checkmark
80.80.0.0/12 ?	344.24 M	256.00 ₽	1.34 k	11.47 M	1.07 k	6.32	
80.48.0.0/13 <u>?</u>	350.93 M	247.00 k	1.42 k	11.70 M	1.03 k	6.10	\checkmark
80.12.0.0/14 <u>?</u>	251.94 M	246.00 k	1.02 k	8.40 M	1.02 k	6.07	\checkmark
0.0.0.0/0 <u>?</u>	276.77 M	241.00 k	1.15 k	9.23 M	1.00 k	5.95	\checkmark
60.0.0/10 ?	264.85 M	232.00 k	1.14 k	8.83 M	966.67	5.73	\checkmark

Destination Addresses								
Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
p (80 (10 and a) (10 f	/32) ?	₹ 5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	✓
Source Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
domain (53)	udp (17)	5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	⋖
Destination Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
13671	udp (17)	67.00 k	1.00 k	67.00	2.23 k	4.17	0.02	
IP Protocol								
Туре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	


Destination Addresses								
Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
(/32) ?	5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	
Source Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
domain (53)	udp (17)	5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	⋖
Destination Ports Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
13671	udp (17)	67.00 k	1.00 k	67.00	2.23 k	4.17	0.02	
IP Protocol								
Туре		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	


IP Protocol								
Туре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	
Ingress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-5/1/0.106	521	3.05 G	2.42 M	1.26 k	101.67 M	10.10 k	59.83	
xe-4/0/0.104	584	1.87 G	1.51 M	1.24 k	62.42 M	6.28 k	37.19	
xe-5/0/1.584	518	66.48 M	66.00 k	1.01 k	2.22 M	275.00	1.63	
xe-4/0/1.386	516	72.22 M	55.00 k	1.31 k	2.41 M	229.17	1.36	
Egress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-4/1/1.76	519	5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	

IP Protocol								
Туре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	
ingress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-5/1/0.106	521	3.05 G	2.42 M	1.26 k	101.67 M	10.10 k	59.83	
xe-4/0/0.104	584	1.87 G	1.51 M	1.24 k	62.42 M	6.28 k	37.19	⋖
re-5/0/1.584	518	66.48 M	66.00 k	1.01 k	2.22 M	275.00	1.63	
xe-4/0/1.386	516	72.22 M	55.00 k	1.31 k	2.41 M	229.17	1.36	
gress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
re-4/1/1.76	519	5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	⋖

Туре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	
ingress Interface								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
-5/1/0.106	521	3.05 G	2.42 M	1.26 k	101.67 M	10.10 k	59.83	
e-4/0/0.104	584	1.87 G	1.51 M	1.24 k	62.42 M	6.28 k	37.19	⋖
e-5/0/1.584	518	66.48 M	66.00 k	1.01 k	2.22 M	275.00	1.63	
e-V0/1.386	516	72.22 M	55.00 k	1.31 k	2.41 M	229.17	1.36	
gress Interfaces								
lame III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
re-4/1/1.76	519	5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	⋖

Туре 🔟		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	
Ingress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-5/1/0.106	521	3.05 G	2.42 M	1.26 k	101.67 M	10.10 k	59.83	
xe-4/0/0.104	584	1.87 G	1.51 M	1.24 k	62.42 M	6.28 k	37.19	
xe-5/0/1.584	518	66.48 M	66.00 k	1.01 k	2.22 M	275.00	1.63	
xe-4/0/1.386	516	72.22 M	55.00 k	1.31 k	2.41 M	229.17	1.36	
Egress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-4/1/1.76	519	5.06 G	4.05 M	1.25 k	168.71 M	16.88 k	100.00	✓





Affected Routers

			Obse	rved bps	Obse	rved pps	
	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall	Details
Router	High	2.00 Kpps	137.70 Mbps	96.15 Mbps	22.58 Kpps	15.86 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 516) xe-4/0/1.386		-	1.98 Mbps	1.27 Mbps	300.00 pps	188.89 pps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 518) xe-5/0/1.584		-	2.18 Mbps	1.29 Mbps	383.00 pps	200.00 pps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 521) xe-5/1/0.106		-	79.11 Mbps	53.43 Mbps	13.18 Kpps	8.89 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 584) xe-4/0/0.104		-	55.11 Mbps	40.16 Mbps	8.92 Kpps	6.58 Kpps	<u>Details</u>

Annotations



Escalated

This alert has been escalated to the security group and mitigated efficiently!

Affected Routers Observed bps Observed pps **Severity Level Expected** Max Overall Max Overall Details High 137.70 Mbps 96.15 Mbps 2.00 Kpps 22.58 Kpps 15.86 Kpps **Details** Interface (SNMP 516) xe-4/0/1.386 1.98 Mbps 1.27 Mbps 300.00 pps 188.89 pps Details Interface (SNMP 518) xe-5/0/1.584 2.18 Mbps 1.29 Mbps 383.00 pps 200.00 pps Details Interface (SNMP 521) xe-5/1/0.106 79.11 Mbps 53.43 Mbps 13.18 Kpps 8.89 Kpps **Details** terface (SNMP 584) xe-4/0/0.104 55.11 Mbps 40.16 Mbps 8.92 Kpps 6.58 Kpps **Details**

Annotations



Escalated

This alert has been escalated to the security group and mitigated efficiently!

Affected Routers

			Obse	rved bps	Obse	erved pps	
	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Ove all	Details
Router	High	2.00 Kpps	137.70 Mbps	96.15 Mbps	22.58 Kpps	15 36 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 516) xe-4/0/1.386		-	1.98 Mbps	1.27 Mbps	300.00 pps	188.89	Details
Interface (SNMP 518) xe-5/0/1.584		-	2.18 Mbps	1.29 Mbps	383.00 pps	200.00 pps	Details
Interface (SNMP 521) xe-5/1/0.106		-	79.11 Mbps	53.43 Mbps	13.18 Kpps	8.89 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 584) xe-4/0/0.104		-	55.11 Mbps	40.16 Mbps	8.92 Kpps	6.58 Kpps	<u>Details</u>

Annotations




Escalated

This alert has been escalated to the security group and mitigated efficiently!

DoS Alert 1077619 Traffic Details





Alert Summary							
ID	Importance	Impact	Duration	Start Time	Direction	Туре	Resource
1077619	High 226.5% Of 10.0 Kpps	138.10 Mbps 22.65 Kpps	0:09 (Ended)	Fri, Apr 4 2014, 01:03:14	Incoming	Fragment (Misuse)	/32
pps		р	ps of affected	elements for alert 1077619			Fri Apr 4 2014
—		•	•				




DoS Alert 1077619 Traffic Details









Source Addresses

Address/Mask	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
80.0.0.0/8 ?	432.54 M	612.00 k	706.76	19.22 M	3.40 k	21.44	⋖
80.64.0.0/11 ?	385.48 M	467.00 k	825.44	17.13 M	2.59 k	16.36	✓
0.0.0.0/0 ?	290.26 M	424.00 k	684.58	12.90 M	2.36 k	14.85	
80.240.0.0/12 ?	281.81 M	399.00 k	706.29	12.52 M	2.22 k	13.98	✓
80.0.0.0/9 ?	303.92 M	379.00 k	801.89	13.51 M	2.11 k	13.27	
80.80.0.0/12 ?	206.59 M	244.00 k	846.66	9.18 M	1.36 k	8.55	⋖
80.128.0.0/9 ?	128.22 M	170.00 k	754.24	5.70 M	944.44	5.95	
80.232.0.0/13 ?	134.64 M	160.00 k	841.51	5.98 M	888.89	5.60	⋖
		>					
Destination Addresses							
Address/Mask	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
(: /32) ?	2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	⋖

Source Addresses Address/Mask **Bytes Packets** Bytes/Pkt bps % pps Filter pps 80.0.0.0/8 ? 432.54 M 612.00 k 706.76 19.22 M 3.40 k 21.44 \checkmark 80.64.0.0/11 ? 385.48 M 467.00 k 825.44 17.13 M 2.59 k 16.36 0.0.0.0/0? 290.26 M 424.00 k 684.58 12.90 M 2.36 k 14.85 80.240.0.0/12 ? 281.81 M 399.00 k 706.29 12.52 M 2.22 k 13.98 303.92 M 379.00 k 80.0.0.0/9 ? 801.89 13.51 M 2.11 k 13.27 80.80.0.0/12 ? 206.59 M 244.00 k 846.66 9.18 M 1.36 k 8.55 80.128.0.0/9 ? 128.22 M 170.00 k 754.24 5.70 M 944.44 5.95 80.232.0.0/13 ? 134.64 M 160.00 k 841.51 5.98 M 888.89 5.60 **Destination Addresses** Address/Mask Bytes/Pkt **Bytes Packets** bps pps % pps Filter \checkmark (: /32) ? 2.16 G 2.86 M 757.78 96.15 M 15.86 k 100.00

Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
0	udp (17)	2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	⋖
Destination Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
0	udp (17)	2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	⋖
IP Protocol								
Туре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	✓

Source Ports

Source Ports								
ort Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
0	udp (17)	2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	
Destination Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
0	udp (17)	2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	
IP Protocol								
Type III		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	

Source Ports

Ingress Interfaces

Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-5/1/0.	521	1.20 G	1.60 M	751.39	53.43 M	8.89 k	56.04	⋖
xe-4/0/0.104	584	903.70 M	1.19 M	762.62	40.16 M	6.58 k	41.51	⋖
xe-5/0/1.584	518	29.06 M	36.00 k	807.34	1.29 M	200.00	1.26	
xe-4/0/1.386	516	28.47 M	34.00 k	837.36	1.27 M	188.89	1.19	


Egress Interfaces

Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-4/1/1.76	519	2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	

Ingres Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-5/1/0.	521	1.20 G	1.60 M	751.39	53.43 M	8.89 k	56.04	⋖
xe-4/0/0.104	584	903.70 M	1.19 M	762.62	40.16 M	6.58 k	41.51	✓
xe-5/0/1.584	518	29.06 M	36.00 k	807.34	1.29 M	200.00	1.26	
ve-4/0/1.386	516	28.47 M	34.00 k	837.36	1.27 M	188.89	1.19	
Egress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-4/1/1.76	519	2.16 G	2.86 M	757.78	96.15 M	15.86 k	100.00	✓

Ingress Interfaces

Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-5/1/0.	521	1.20 G	1.60 M	751.39	53.43 M	8.89 k	56.04	⋖
xe-4/0/0.104	584	903.70 M	1.19 M	762.62	40.16 M	6.58 k	41.51	⋖
xe-5/0/1.584	518	29.06 M	36.00 k	807.34	1.29 M	200.00	1.26	
xe-4/0/1.386	516	28.47 M	34.00 k	837.36	1.27 M	188.89	1.19	



SNMP Reflection/Amplification

Amplification Factor - SNMP

Abbreviation	Protocol	Ports	Amplification Factor	# Abusable Servers
CHARGEN	Character Generation Protocol	UDP / 19	18x/1000x	Tens of thousands (90K)
DNS	D omain N ame S ystem	UDP / 53	160x	Millions (27M)
NTP	Network Time Protocol	UDP / 123	1000x	Over One Hundred Thousand (119K)
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol	UDP / 161	880x	Millions (5M)
SSDP	Simple Service Discovery Protocol	UDP /1900	20x/83x	Millions (2M)

Characteristics of an SNMP Reflection/Amplification Attack

- The attacker spoofs the IP address of the target of the attack, sends an SNMP GetBulkRequest query to abusable SNMP services running on home CPE devices, large ISP and enterprise routers, servers, etc. These packets are typically between 60 – 102 bytes in length
- The attacker chooses the UDP port which he'd like to target – it can be any port of the attacker's choice – and uses that as the source port. The destination port is UDP/ 161.
- The SNMP services 'reply' to the attack target with streams of 423-byte – 1560-byte packets sourced from UDP/161; the destination port is the source port the attacker chose when generating the SNMP queries.

Characteristics of an SNMP Reflection/Amplification Attack (cont.)

- As these multiple streams of SNMP replies converge, the attack volume can be very large – the largest verified attack of this type so far is over 60gb/sec. 20-30gb/sec attacks are commonplace.
- Due to sheer attack volume, the Internet transit bandwidth of the target, along with core bandwidth of the target's peers/upstreams, as well as the core bandwidth of intermediary networks between the various SNMP services being abused and the target, are saturated.
- More savvy attackers will enumerate the individual SNMP Object IDentifiers (OIDs) on the abusable SNMP services, and enumerate each one with iterative parallel spoofed SNMP queries. Lots of non-initial fragments in this scenario, a la DNS.
- In most attacks, between ~2,000-4,000 abusable SNMP services are leveraged by attackers. Up to 10,000 SNMP services have been observed in some attacks.

SNMP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology



Abusable SNMP Services


Internet-Accessible Servers, Routers, Home CPE devices, etc.





172.19.234.6/32


SNMP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology



108

172.19.234.6/32

SNMP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology







chargen Reflection/Amplification

Amplification Factor - chargen

Abbreviation	Protocol	Ports	Amplification Factor	# Abusable Servers
CHARGEN	Character Generation Protocol	UDP / 19	18x/1000x	Tens of thousands (90K)
DNS	D omain N ame S ystem	UDP / 53	160x	Millions (27M)
NTP	Network Time Protocol	UDP / 123	1000x	Over One Hundred Thousand (119K)
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol	UDP / 161	880x	Millions (5M)
SSDP	Simple Service Discovery Protocol	UDP /1900	20x/83x	Millions (2M)

Characteristics of a chargen Reflection/Amplification Attack

- The attacker spoofs the IP address of the target of the attack, sends packets padded with at least 18 bytes of payload (allzeroes; 70-byte packet) to multiple abusable chargen services running on servers, printers, home CPE devices, etc.
- The attacker chooses the UDP port which he'd like to target –
 it can be any port greater than 1023 and uses that as the
 source port. The destination port is UDP/19.
- The chargen services 'reply' to the attack target with ~1000-byte ~1500-bytes packets sourced from UDP/19 to the target; the destination port is the source port the attacker chose when he generated the chargen queries. Most chargen services generate one response packet for each request packets, but some non-RFC-compliant chargen services send more packets/query.

Characteristics of a chargen Reflection/Amplification Attack (cont.)

- As these multiple streams of chargen replies converge, the attack volume can be quite large – the largest verified attack of this type so far is over 137gb/sec. 2-5gb/sec attacks are commonplace.
- Due to sheer attack volume, the Internet transit bandwidth of the target, along with core bandwidth of the target's peers/ upstreams, as well as the core bandwidth of intermediary networks between the various chargen services being abused and the target, can be saturated.
- Non-RFC-compliant chargen services can provide an amplification factor of up to 1000:1 (most are 18:1).
- In most attacks, between ~20 ~2,000 abusable chargen services are leveraged by attackers. Up to 5,000 chargen services have been observed in some attacks.

chargen Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology




Abusable chargen Services

Internet-Accessible Servers, Routers, Home CPE devices, etc.






chargen Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology





chargen Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology




















Affected Routers

				Observed bps		Observed pps	
	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall	Details
Router eq-chi2	High	5.00 Kpps	147.33 Mbps	73.92 Mbps	15.45 Kpps	7.76 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 516) xe-4/0/1.386		-	500.13 Kbps	500.14 Kbps	50.00 pps	50.00 pps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 518) xe-5/0/1.584		-	76.11 Mbps	38.15 Mbps	8.12 Kpps	4.07 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 521) xe-5/1/0.106		-	49.96 Mbps	25.13 Mbps	5.10 Kpps	2.57 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 584) xe-4/0/0.104		-	20.76 Mbps	10.38 Mbps	2.18 Kpps	1.10 Kpps	<u>Details</u>

Annotations



Escalated

This alert has been escalated to the security group and mitigated efficiently!

chargen reflection/amplification attack.

Affected Routers

				Observed bps		Observed pps	
	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Over all	Details
Router eq-chi2	High	5.00 Kpps	147.33 Mbps	73.92 Mbps	15.45 Kpps	7. 6 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 516) xe-4/0/1.386		-	500.13 Kbps	500.14 Kbps	50.00 pps	50.00 , 95	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 518) xe-5/0/1.584		-	76.11 Mbps	38.15 Mbps	8.12 Kpps	4.07 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 521) xe-5/1/0.106		-	49.96 Mbps	25.13 Mbps	5.10 Kpps	2.57 Kpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 584) xe-4/0/0.104		-	20.76 Mbps	10.38 Mbps	2.18 Kpps	1.10 Kpps	<u>Details</u>

Annotations




Escalated


This alert has been escalated to the security group and mitigated efficiently!


chargen reflection/amplification attack.

DoS Alert 1078798 Traffic Details









Source Addresses								
Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
0.0.0.0/0 ?		940.18 M	792.00 k	1.19 k	62.68 M	6.60 k	85.07	⋖
218.0.0.0/8 ?		108.55 M	91.00 k	1.19 k	7.24 M	758.33	9.77	
61.128.0.0/10 ?		60.03 M	48.00 k	1.25 k	4.00 M	400.00	5.16	
Destination Addresses	k							
Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
Sales (ICCH) water arrow and	/32) ?	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	⋖
Source Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
chargen (19)	udp (17)	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	
Destination Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
1029	udp (17)	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	⋖

Source Addresses							
Address/Mask	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
0.0.0.0/0 ?	940.18 M	792.00 k	1.19 k	62.68 M	6.60 k	85.07	⋖
218.0.0.0/8 ?	108.55 M	91.00 k	1.19 k	7.24 M	758.33	9.77	
61.128.0.0/10 ?	60.03 M	48.00 k	1.25 k	4.00 M	400.00	5.16	
Destination Addresses							
Address/Mask	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
//32	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	⋖
Source Ports							
Port Range Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
chargen (19) udp (17)	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	⋖
Destination Ports							
Port Range Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
1029 udp (17)	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	

IP Protocol								
Туре		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	✓
Ingress Interfaces			b					
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-5/0/1.584 (518	572.30 M	488.00 k	1.17 k	38.15 M	4.07 k	52.42	
xe-5/1/0.106	521	376.97 M	308.00 k	1.22 k	25.13 M	2.57 k	33.08	
xe-4/0/0.104	584	155.73 M	132.00 k	1.18 k	10.38 M	1.10 k	14.18	⋖
xe-4/0/1.386	516	3.75 M	3.00 k	1.25 k	250.07 k	25.00	0.32	
Egress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-4/1/1.76	519	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	⋖

P Protocol								
Гуре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	
ngross Interfaces			k					
ame III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
e-5/0/1.584(518	572.30 M	488.00 k	1.17 k	38.15 M	4.07 k	52.42	⋖
e-5/1/0.106	521	376.97 M	308.00 k	1.22 k	25.13 M	2.57 k	33.08	⋖
e-4/0/0.104	584	155.73 M	132.00 k	1.18 k	10.38 M	1.10 k	14.18	
e 1/0/1.386	516	3.75 M	3.00 k	1.25 k	250.07 k	25.00	0.32	
gress Interfaces								
Name 📶	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-4/1/1.76	519	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	⋖

Туре 🔟		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	⋖
ngress Interfaces			+					
Name 📶	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-5/0/1.584(518	572.30 M	488.00 k	1.17 k	38.15 M	4.07 k	52.42	
xe-5/1/0.106	521	376.97 M	308.00 k	1.22 k	25.13 M	2.57 k	33.08	
xe-4/0/0.104	584	155.73 M	132.00 k	1.18 k	10.38 M	1.10 k	14.18	
xe-4/0/1.386	516	3.75 M	3.00 k	1.25 k	250.07 k	25.00	0.32	
Egress Terraces								
ame III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
xe-4/1/1.76	519	1.11 G	931.00 k	1.19 k	73.92 M	7.76 k	100.00	✓

SSDP Reflection/Amplification

Amplification Factor - SSDP

Abbreviation	Protocol	Ports	Amplification Factor	# Abusable Servers
CHARGEN	Char acter Gen eration Protocol	UDP / 19	18x/1000x	Tens of thousands (90K)
DNS	Domain Name System	UDP / 53	160x	Millions (27M)
NTP	Network Time Protocol	UDP / 123	1000x	Over One Hundred Thousand (119K)
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol	UDP / 161	880x	Millions (5M)
SSDP	Simple Service Discovery Protocol	UDP /1900	20x/83x	Millions (2M)

Characteristics of an SSDP Reflection/Amplification Attack

- The attacker spoofs the IP address of the target of the attack, sends an SSDP M-Search query to abusable SSDP services running on home CPE devices and some older Windows XP systems These packets are typically ~118 bytes in length.
- The attacker chooses the UDP port which he'd like to target – it can be any port of the attacker's choice – and uses that as the source port. The destination port is UDP/ 1900.
- The SSDP services 'reply' to the attack target with streams of 1360-byte – 9800-byte packets sourced from UDP/1900; the destination port is the source port the attacker chose when generating the SSDP queries. These packets will consist of initial and non-initial UDP fragments.

Characteristics of an SSDP Reflection/Amplification Attack (cont.)

- As these multiple streams of SSDP replies converge, the attack volume can be very large – the largest verified attack of this type so far is over 42gb/sec. 10-35gb/sec attacks are commonplace.
- Due to sheer attack volume, the Internet transit bandwidth of the target, along with core bandwidth of the target's peers/upstreams, as well as the core bandwidth of intermediary networks between the various SSDP services being abused and the target, are saturated.
- More savvy attackers will identify the individual SSDP services available on the abusable SSDP-enabled devices, and enumerate them with iterative parallel spoofed SSDP queries. Lots of noninitial fragments in this scenario, a la DNS.
- In most attacks, between ~4,000-6,000 abusable SSDP services are leveraged by attackers. Up to 10,000 abusable SSDP services have been observed in some attacks.

SSDP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology




Abusable SSDP Services

Internet-Accessible CPE devices, old Windows XP boxes, etc.






SSDP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology




137


SSDP Reflection/Amplification Attack Methodology























ffected Routers							
			Observe		Obser	bserved pps	
	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall	Detail
outer	High	50.00 Kpps	40.14 Gbps	20.25 Gbps	9.94 Mpps	4.79 Mpps	Details
Interface (SNMP 315) Bundle-Ether2.1013		-	1.20 Gbps	549.60 Mbps	287.47 Kpps	166.81 Kpps	Details
Interface (SNMP 344) Bundle-Ether100.2002		-	3.89 Mbps	2.15 Mbps	1.48 Kpps	757.14 pps	Details
Interface (SNMP 299) Bundle-Ether6453			10.62 Gbps	3.70 Gbps	965.25 Kpps	559.58 Kpps	Detail
Interface (SNMP 478) Bundle-Ether44530		-	5.40 Mbps	5.22 Mbps	533.00 pps	505.56 pps	Detail
Interface (SNMP 480) Bundle-Ether1299			22.46 Gbps	14.26 Gbps	8.52 Mpps	3.83 Mpps	Detail
interface (SNMP 569) Bundle-Ether3356			4.96 Gbps	1.81 Gbps	448.37 Kpps	295.68 Kpps	Detail
Interface (SNMP 626) Bundle-Ether3.4090		-	2.11 Gbps	792.03 Mbps	191.38 Kpps	90.91 Kpps	Detail
outer	High	50.00 Kpps	2.24 Gbps	934.88 Mbps	294.82 Kpps	178.77 Kpps	Detail
Interface (SNMP 88) TenGigE0/0/0/17		-	2.22 Mbps	1.78 Mbps	200.00 pps	155.56 pps	Detail
Interface (SNMP 274) TenGigE0/0/0/11.4080	▶	-	2.49 Mbps	1.76 Mbps	233.00 pps	161.11 pps	Detail
Interface (SNMP 361) Bundle-Ether44530		-	12.51 Mbps	5.46 Mbps	1.12 Kpps	891.44 pps	Detail
Interface (SNMP 445) Bundle-Ether3.4080			2.09 Gbps	787.81 Mbps	189.22 Kpps	90.86 Kpps	Detail
Interface (SNMP 470) TenGigE0/4/0/20.4			634.94 Mbps	298.68 Mbps	244.43 Kpps	105.23 Kpps	Detail

			Obser	ved bps	Obser	erved pps	
	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall	Details
outer	High	50.00 Kpps	40.14 Gbps	20.25 Gbps	9.94 Mpps	4.79 Mpps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 315) Bundle-Ether2.1013		-	1.20 Gbps	549.60 Mbps	287.47 Kpps	166.81 Kpp	Dotall
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Interface (SNMP 478) Bundle-Ether44530		-	5.40 Mbps	5.22 Mbps	533.00 pps	505.56 pps	<u>Details</u>
Interface (SNMP 480) Bundle-Ether1299		-	22.46 Gbps	14.26 Gbps	8.52 Mpps	3.83 Mpps	<u>Details</u>
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Interface (SNMP 274) TenGigE0/0/0/11.4080	Ŋ.	-	2.49 Mbps	1.76 Mbps	233.00 pps	161.11 pps	<u>Details</u>
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Interface (SNMP 470) TenGigE0/4/0/20.4		-	634.94 Mbps	298.68 Mbps	244.43 Kpps	105.23 Kpps	Details

Mitigate Alert



Affected Network Elements

			Observe	d bps	Observed pps	
Network Element	Severity Level	Expected	Max	Overall	Max	Overall
Router	high	50.00 kpps	40.14 G	20.25 G	9.94 M	4.79 M
Interface 480 Bundle-Ether1299		-	22.46 G	14.26 G	8.52 M	3.83 M

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Summary								
		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps		
		1.18 T	2.53 G	465.76	14.26 G	3.83 M		
Source Addresses					_			
Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
0.0.0.0/0 ?		721.81 G	1.11 G	647.97	8.75 G	1.69 M	44.12	⋖
27.192.0.0/11 ?		138.49 G	428.31 M	323.35	1.68 G	648.95 k	16.96	⋖
117.0.0.0/9 ?		99.91 G	311.60 M	320.63	1.21 G	472.12 k	12.34	⋖
218.0.0.0/9 ?		84.05 G	259.96 M	323.32	1.02 G	393.88 k	10.30	⋖
180.96.0.0/11 ?		68.35 G	213.31 M	320.45	828.54 M	323.19 k	8.45	⋖
27.128.0.0/9 ?		63.46 G	197.93 M	320.62	769.22 M	299.89 k	7.84	⋖
Destination Addresses Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
'32 <u>?</u>		1.18 T	2.53 G	465.76	14.26 G	3.83 M	100.00	⋖
Source Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
1900	udp (17)	703.33 G	2.18 G	322.31	8.53 G	3.31 M	86.42	⋖
0	udp (17)	470.92 G	339.82 M	1.39 k	5.71 G	514.87 k	13.46	⋖
0 - 32767	udp (17)	145.17 M	1.33 M	108.91	1.76 M	2.02 k	0.05	

Destination Ports

Summary								
		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps		
		1.18 T	2.53 G	465.76	14.26 G	3.83 M		
Source Addresses								
Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
0.0.0.0/0 <u>?</u>		721.81 G	1.11 G	647.97	8.75 G	1.69 M	44.12	⋖
27.192.0.0/11 <u>?</u>		138.49 G	428.31 M	323.35	1.68 G	648.95 k	16.96	⋖
117.0.0.0/9 ?		99.91 G	311.60 M	320.63	1.21 G	472.12 k	12.34	⋖
218.0.0.0/9 ?		84.05 G	259.96 M	323.32	1.02 G	393.88 k	10.30	⋖
180.96.0.0/11 ?		68.35 G	213.31 M	320.45	828.54 M	323.19 k	8.45	⋖
27.128.0.0/9 <u>?</u>		63.46 G	197.93 M	320.62	769.22 M	299.89 k	7.84	⋖
Des Ination Add asses Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
'32 <u>?</u>		1.18 T	2.53 G	465.76	14.26 G	3.83 M	100.00	⋖
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Destination Ports

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0.0.0.0/0 ?		721.81 G	1.11 G	647.97	8.75 G	1.69 M	44.12	⋖
27.192.0.0/11 ?		138.49 G	428.31 M	323.35	1.68 G	648.95 k	16.96	⋖
117.0.0.0/9 ?		99.91 G	311.60 M	320.63	1.21 G	472.12 k	12.34	⋖
218.0.0.0/9 ?		84.05 G	259.96 M	323.32	1.02 G	393.88 k	10.30	⋖
180.96.0.0/11 ?		68.35 G	213.31 M	320.45	828.54 M	323.19 k	8.45	⋖
27.128.0.0/9 ?		63.46 G	197.93 M	320.62	769.22 M	299.89 k	7.84	⋖
Destination Addresses								
Address/Mask		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
'32 <u>?</u>		1.18 T	2.53 G	465.76	14.26 G	3.83 M	100.00	⋖
Source Ports								
	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
Port lange IIII		702.22.0	2.18 G	322.31	8.5 ° G	3.31 M	86.42	⋖
Port range III	udp (17)	703.33 G	2.10 0					
	udp (17) udp (17)	470.92 G	339.82 M	1.39 k	5.71 0	514.87 k	13.46	⋖

Destination Pe								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
300	udp (17)	703.57 G	2.18 G	322.31	8.53 G	3.31 M	86.45	⋖
0	udp (17)	470.92 G	339.82 M	1.39 k	5.71 G	514.87 k	13.46	⋖
9 - 32767	udp (17)	29.05 M	21.00 k	1.38 k	352.14 k	31.82	0.00	
IP Protocol	ν,							
туре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		1.18 T	2.53 G	465.76	14.26 G	3.83 M	100.00	⋖
Ingress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
Bundle-Ether1299	480	1.18 T	2.53 G	465.76	14.26 G	3.83 M	100.00	⋖
Egress Interfaces								
Name III	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
TenGigE0/7/0/20	143	793.91 G	2.25 G	353.08	9.62 G	3.41 M	89.05	⋖
TenGigE0/0/0/10.4090	705	359.31 G	261.05 M	1.38 k	4.36 G	395.53 k	10.34	⋖
index:0	0	6.89 G	4.68 M	1.47 k	83.55 M	7.09 k	0.19	

Destination Ports								
Port Range	Protocol	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
300	udp (17)	703.57 G	2.18 G	322.31	8.53 G	3.31 M	86.45	✓
0	udp (17)	470.92 G	339.82 M	1.39 k	5.71 G	514.87 k	13.46	⋖
0 - 32767	udp (17)	29.05 M	21.00 k	1.38 k	352.14 k	31.82	0.00	
IP Protocol								
туре Ш		Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
udp (17)		1.18 T	2.53 G	465.76	14.26 G	3.83 M	100.00	⋖
Ingress Interfaces	ifIndex	Bytes	Packets	Bytes/Pkt	bps	pps	% pps	Filter
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TenGigE0/0/0/10.4090	705	359.31 G	261.05 M	1.38 k	4.36 G	395.53 k	10.34	☑

How Much Spoofed Traffic Yields a 100gb/sec DDoS Attack?

How Much Spoofed Traffic Yields a 100gb/sec DDoS Attack?

- DNS 160:1 amplification factor
 - 625mb/sec of spoofed DNS queries for 100gb/sec attack
 - Largest observed in 2014 104gb/sec, 125gb/sec reported
- ntp 1000:1 amplification factor
 - 100mb/sec of spoofed ntp queries for 100gb/sec attack
 - Largest observed in 2014 325gb/sec, 450gb/sec reported
- chargen 18:1 / 1000:1 amplification factor
 - 100mb/sec 5.5gb/sec of spoofed chargen queries for 100gb/sec attack
 - Largest observed in 2014 96gb/sec, 120gb/sec reported
- SNMP 880:1 amplification factor for optimized attack
 - 114mb/sec of spoofed, iterated SNMP queries for 100gb/sec attack
 - Largest observed in 2014 18gb/sec, 60gb/sec reported
- SSDP 20:1 / 83:1 amplification factor
 - 1.2gb/sec 5gb/sec of spoofed SSDP queries for 100gb/sec attack
 - Largest observed in 2014 131gb/sec
- MS SQL Replication Service, aka SQL Slammer-on-Demand 173:1 473:1 amplification factor
 - 211mb/sec 578mb/sec of spoofed MS SQL RS queries for 100gb/sec attack
 - Largest observed in 2014 N/A

Mitigating Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attacks

What Not to Do!

- Do not indiscriminately block UDP/123 on your networks!
- Do not indiscriminately block UDP/53 on your networks!
- Do not block UDP/53 packets larger than 512 bytes!
- Do not block TCP/53 on your networks!
- Do not indiscriminately block UDP/161 on your networks!
- Do not indiscriminately block UDP/19 on your networks!
- Do not indiscriminately block UDP/1900 on your networks!
- Do not indiscriminately block fragments on your networks!
- Do not block all ICMP on your networks! At the very least, allow ICMP Type-3/Code-4, required for PMTU-D.

If you do these things, you will break the Internet for your customers/users!

Don't Be Part of the Problem!

- Deploy antispoofing at all network edges.
 - uRPF Loose-Mode/Feasible-Mode at the peering edge
 - uRPF Strict Mode at customer aggregation edge
 - ACLs at the customer aggregation edge
 - uRPF Strict-Mode and/or ACLs at the Internet Data Center (IDC) aggregation edge
 - DHCP Snooping (works for static addresses, too) and IP
 Source Verify at the IDC LAN access edge
 - PACLs & VACLs at the IDC LAN access edge
 - Cable IP Source Verify, etc. at the CMTS
 - Other DOCSIS & DSL mechanisms
- If you get a reputation as a spoofing-friendly network, you will be de-peered/de-transited and/or blocked!

Don't Be Part of the Problem! (cont.)

- Proactively scan for and remediate abusable services on your network and on customer/user networks, including blocking traffic to/from abusable services if necessary in order to attain compliance
- Check http://www.openntpproject.org to see if abusable NTP services have been identified on your networks and/or customer/user networks
- Check http://www.openresolverproject.org to see if abusable open DNS recursors have been identified on your network or on customer/user networks.
- Collateral damage from these attacks is widespread if there are abusable services on your networks or customer/user networks, your customers/users will experience significant outages and performance issues, and your help-desk will light up!

Detection/Classification/Traceback/Mitigation

- Utilize flow telemetry (NetFlow, cflowd/jflow, etc.) exported from all network edges for attack detection/classification/traceback
 - Many open-source tools available, no excuse not to get started!
- Enforce standard network access policies in front of servers/ services via stateless ACLs in hardware-based routers/layer-3 switches.
- Ensure recursive DNS servers are not queryable from the public Internet – only from your customers/users.
- Ensure SNMP is disabled/blocked on public-facing infrastructure/servers.
- Disallow level-6/-7 NTP queries from the public Internet.
- Disable all unnecessary services such as chargen.
- Regularly audit network infrastructure and servers/services.

Detection/Classification/Traceback/Mitigation (cont.)

- Deploy network infrastructure-based reaction/mitigation techniques such as S/RTBH and flowspec at all network edges.
- Deploy intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMSes) in mitigation centers located at topologically-appropriate points within your networks to mitigate attacks.
- Ensure sufficient mitigation capacity and diversion/re-injection bandwidth – S/RTBH, flowspec, IDMS. Consider OOB mitigation center links from edge routers to guarantee 'scrubbing' bandwidth.
- Enterprises/ASPs should subscribe to 'Clean Pipes' DDoS mitigation services from ISPs/MSSPs.
- Consumer broadband operators should consider minimal default
 ACLs to limit the impact of service abuse on customer networks.
- User the power of the RFP to specify secure default configurations for PE & CPE devices – and verify via testing.
- Know who to contact at your peers/transits to get help.
- Participate in the global operational security community.

Detection/Classification/Traceback/Mitigation (cont.)

- ISPs should consider deploying Quality-of-Service (QoS) mechanisms at all network edges to police non-timesync NTP traffic down to an appropriate level (i.e., 1mb/sec).
 - NTP timesync packets are 76 bytes in length (all sizes are minus layer-2 framing)
 - NTP monlist replies are ~468 bytes in length
 - Observed NTP monlist requests utilized in these attacks are 50, 60, and 234 bytes in length
 - Option 1 police all non-76-byte UDP/123 traffic (source, destination, or both) down to 1mb/sec. This will police both attack source reflector/amplifier traffic as well as reflector/amplifier target traffic
 - Option 2 police all 400-byte or larger UDP/123 traffic (source) down to 1mb/sec. This will police only reflector/amplifier target traffic
 - NTP timesync traffic will be unaffected
 - Additional administrative (rarely-used) NTP functions such as *ntptrace* will only be affected during an attack
- Enterprises/ASPs should only allow NTP queries/responses to/from specific NTP services, disallow all others.

Scaling Mitigation Capacity - 4tb/sec and Beyond

- Currently-shipping largest-capacity Intelligent DDoS Mitigation System (IDMS) – 40gb/sec
- 16-IDMS (CEF/ECMP limit) = 640gb/sec per cluster
- Multiple clusters can be anycasted
- Largest number of IDMSes per deployment currently 100 = 4tb/sec of mitigation capacity per deployment, 10x more than largest DDoS to date.
- Deploy IDMSes in mitigation centers at edges in/out of edge devices.
- Deploy IDMSes in regional or centralized mitigation centers with dedicated, high-capacity OOB diversion/re-injection links. Sufficient bandwidth for diversion/re-injection is key!
- S/RTBH & flowspec leverage router/switch hardware, hundreds of mpps, gb/sec. Leveraging network infrastructure is required due to ratio of attack volumes to peering and core link capacities!

Conclusion

Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attack Summary

- Abusable services are widely misimplemented/ misconfigured across the Internet
- Large pools of abusable servers/services
- Gaps in anti-spoofing at network edges
- High amplification ratios
- Low difficulty of execution
- Readily-available attack tools
- Extremely high impact 'The sky is falling!'
- Significant risk for potential targets and intermediate networks/bystanders

On the Origins of Spoofed Traffic

- NAT is ugly, breaks things, and has no inherent security value.
- However, there's been one beneficial side-effect of the prevalence of NAT on broadband access networks – anti-spoofing (you generally can't spoof traffic from behind a NAT, unless it's broken).
- We believe that a lot of the spoofed traffic used to initiate reflection/ amplification DDoS attacks originates from servers under the control of attackers in hosting/co-location/VPS/'cloud' Internet Data Centers (IDCs) which don't enforce source address validation.
- Servers may be compromised; may be VPS rented by attackers; may be hosted by 'bulletproof' providers.
- Flow telemetry collection/analysis tools perform automagic traceback of spoofed traffic to network ingress points - but only within one's own span of administrative control.

What is to Be Done?

- Initiate project to rent shell/VPS instances around the world, run Spoofer Project-type code on VPS instances, compile reports of IDCs/hosters/co-locators who allow spoofing. Somewhere to start, at least.
- Discuss the possibility of including Spoofer Project-type functionality in operating systems with the relevant vendors/organizations (Microsoft, Apple, Google, Linux distros, *BSD distros, console vendors, Cisco, Juniper, Linksys, Asus, etc.).
- Learning mechanism for IP Source Guard- or pACL/vACL-type functionality enabled by default on layer-2 switch ports configured as access ports – network infrastructure vendors. IDC access-layer is a relatively restricted domain with a smaller scope for undesirable outcomes and greater probability of success.
- 'SDN' auto-provisioning of source address validation mechanisms? >cringe
- Improve spoofed traffic classification, inter-operator cooperative traceback capabilities – flow telemetry collection/analysis tool vendors.
- Work with insurance companies to help them understand unsecured risks, develop auditing capabilities.

Are We Doomed?

- No! Deploying existing, well-known tools/techniques/BCPs results in a vastly improved security posture with measurable results.
- Evolution of defenses against these attacks demonstrates that positive change is possible – targeted organizations & defending ISPs/MSSPs have altered architectures, mitigation techniques, processes, and procedures to successfully mitigate these attacks.
- Mitigation capacities are scaling to meet and exceed attack volumes – deployment architecture, diversion/re-injection bandwidth, leveraging network infrastructure are key.
- Automation is a Good Thing, but it is no substitute for resilient architecture, insightful planning, and smart opsec personnel, who are more important now than ever before!

Discussion

This Presentation – http://bit.ly/1IHksUH





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