

# Cyber Incident Reporting Framework

Cyber Threat Alliance

Institute for Security and Technology

CREST

CipherTrace

Coveware

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Cybercrime Support Network

Cyber Peace Institute

Open Cybersecurity Alliance

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Multiple industry organizations have come together to provide input regarding cyber incident reporting. This group has identified a set of principles that the incident reporting regulation should incorporate, and we have developed a set of model reporting formats the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) could use as the foundation for the reporting forms.

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# Section 1: Purpose, Expectations, and Definitions

## Purpose

Incident reporting can simultaneously serve multiple purposes. We recommend that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) identify the reporting requirement's purposes, consistent with the underlying statute. Since these purposes differ in the granularity of information required, CISA should specify the use cases as part of the regulation. Such purposes can include:

**Trend Identification:** Collecting data across multiple incidents at multiple companies could allow the federal government to better understand adversary activities in the aggregate and identify trends in adversary activities, such as victim, mission, and sector targeting.

**Indication and Warning:** Reporting could allow the federal government to warn similarly situated organizations about impending threats.

**Response:** Reporting could be used to drive asset and/or threat response activities (as defined in Presidential Policy Directive-41) and inform policy discussions including about the effectiveness of deployed strategies.

**Assessing Impact and Harm:** Reporting can contribute to a better understanding of the harm and impact cyber incidents cause to both targeted organizations, individuals, and society.

## Expectations

CISA should use the regulation to set clear expectations on several topics.

**What Happens after Reporting an Incident:** CISA should acknowledge that the report has been received, and organizations should expect to receive such confirmation. Beyond this acknowledgement, however, the regulation should also make clear what will not necessarily happen; for example, just because a company reports an incident does not mean that law enforcement agents will open a case. If the federal response does not align with expectations, the reporting requirement could be seen as a failure.

**Information Distribution and Handling:** CISA should indicate to the reporting entity how they will use the data, how they will protect any information provided (including the identity of the

reporting entity), and what other federal entities could receive the reported data under what conditions.

## Definitions

The statute directs CISA to define a “substantial cyber incident” and “covered entity” in the regulation. We offer the following definition of substantial cyber incident for consideration:

A substantial cyber incident is one that causes:

- An undesired effect on an IT, OT, other digital system, or social media account and
- Material loss of, compromise in, unauthorized access to, or denial of access to:
  - Sensitive non-public data, personally identifiable information, intellectual property, or trade secrets;
  - Revenue, income, or assets;
  - Business operations or system functionality; or,
  - Brand or corporate reputation

In addition to the requirement to consider consequences and threats contained in Section 2242(c)(1) in defining “covered entities,” we recommend excluding very small companies from the definition. Consistent with this approach, we offer the following exclusion for consideration.

A covered entity is an entity that owns or operates an IT, OT, other digital system, or social media account in one or more of the critical sectors defined in Presidential Policy Directive-21 and has:

- More than 50 employees,
- More than 1,000 customers, or
- Revenues greater than \$5 million.

Beyond the definition, ensuring that every organization knows whether it is a covered entity is a difficult challenge. CISA should consider a public awareness campaign to make sure as many organizations understand their obligations as possible. Further, some organizations may ask CISA to determine whether they are a covered entity, so CISA should be prepared to handle such inquiries.

## Section 2: Principles

In developing the incident reporting regulation, we recommend that CISA and similarly situated organizations incorporate the following 10 principles. Following these principles will advance the quality, quantity, and utility of the reporting while minimizing the burden on the covered entities.

**Usability and Accessibility:** Incident reporting forms should be as easy to use and accessible as possible (such as having drop down fields or pre-populated defaults). Having the forms be available and filed through an on-line portal is critical, as well as having mobile versions and an API for machine readable submissions. Many organizations lack access to sophisticated cybersecurity practitioners, and those experiencing a significant cyber incident have limited time and capacity to meet reporting requirements. The government should minimize the burden on covered entities in these situations. Further, the shorter and easier the incident reporting form is to fill out, the more likely non-covered entities are to voluntarily report cyber incidents.

**Security and Confidentiality:** CISA should take appropriate steps to secure the incident reporting system and associated data, including minimization, anonymization, and aggregation when appropriate. It should also specify when it would consider incident reporting information to be Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII). In addition, CISA should be transparent about how it will maintain privacy for any information shared as part of the incident reporting process. CISA should also specify how long it will retain the reported information and at what level of detail. This system should have a comprehensive security audit before launch. Finally, since organizations should not report incidents from networks reasonably believed to be compromised, allowing reports to come from alternative channels, such as forensic investigators or an ISAC, will be important.

**Automation:** The incident reporting process should be automated within the government and use industry standards, such as the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) or Structured Threat Intelligence eXchange (STIX).

**Relevance:** CISA should develop a limited, core set of fields that every reporting entity must answer. Beyond the core questions, the reporting form should have different fields depending on the incident being reported. Finally, formats should be expandable to include additional technical fields, based on criteria such as the size and/or technical capability of the reporting entity, the severity of the reported incident, or other factors. If CISA determines that the scale and impact of the reported incident warrants follow up, then the regulation should allow it to request additional information from the reporting entity.

**Iteration:** The details regarding a cyber incident will evolve over time and the affected organizations will learn more as the incident response continues. Therefore, CISA should expect that incident reports will change over time, sometimes substantially from the initial one. The reporting process should incentivize organizations to update their previous reports as they learn more. Updates should be made upon discovering a material shift in previously reported information. Although the initial reporting deadline is specified in the statute, CISA should consider whether to set subsequent reporting deadlines in the regulation, such as requiring a final report no more than six months after an incident is considered resolved.

**No Third-Party Liability or Obligations:** The implementing regulation should clarify that third parties have no obligation to report a cyber incident independent of the covered entity. CISA

should also clarify whether reporting to a sector-based Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) will continue to count as reporting the incident to CISA for those sectors where such reporting has been the standard in the past.

**Equivalence and Interoperability:** Many organizations are subject to multiple reporting requirements. To the maximum extent possible, the federal government should standardize incident reporting forms across departments and agencies to better aggregate data, analyze trends, and recover ransoms. However, since achieving such standardization will take time, allowing organizations to submit incident reports using the format required by other agencies (for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission) would reduce the burden on industry. Therefore, CISA should consider those other formats as “equivalent” to the CISA format and treat their submission as meeting the statute’s reporting requirement until the Federal government adopts a unified standard. Similarly, we recommend that other agencies adopt CISA’s reporting formats as the standard.

**Harmonization:** Along with equivalence, CISA should promote harmonization of reporting requirements, not only domestically within the US, but internationally. As the number of countries with reporting requirements increases, having internationally recognized standards would be extremely beneficial to companies operating in multiple jurisdictions. Such standardization would also enable intelligence sharing among countries.

**Reporting Culture:** CISA should encourage all businesses to report substantial cyber incidents, regardless of whether they are subject to the mandatory reporting requirement. Implementing this recommendation would involve updating other CISA materials. For example, the CISA Ransomware Response Checklist and the CISA ransomware guide do not include an explicit recommendation to report, and instead only reference reporting as one way to contact CISA regarding anomalous cyber activity.

**No Automatic Trigger:** To the extent allowable under statute, CISA should make clear that filing an incident report under this regulation does not automatically trigger any other reporting action or obligation. Organizations will have to determine whether to file reports with other oversight bodies or agencies based on those reporting requirements, not just because the incident qualified for a report under this statute.

## Section 3: Incident Reporting Fields

Consistent with the principles in Section 2, the incident reporting system forms should have multiple layers. The first layer should contain fields applicable to all incidents and that could be filled out by non-experts. The second layer should contain incident specific fields that would differ depending on the incident type. The third layer should contain fields to collect technical information from cybersecurity professionals; this layer would be optional depending on whether the reporting entity has access to the requisite expertise. This framework provides

sample fields for CISA's consideration.

CISA should provide definitions and guidance for the fields included in the incident reporting forms. This guidance will be particularly important for small and medium enterprises who may not have access to cybersecurity expertise. Information on the types of malicious activity covered in the reporting form should be discussed upfront in non-technical language to help reduce the potential of accidental and false reporting.

## Layer 1: General information fields applicable to all incidents

### A) Victim Information

- Organization name and other identifying information (state of incorporation, legal trade names, headquarters location or incident location, etc.)
- Entity type (corporation, LLC, nonprofit; State, Local, Territorial, or Tribal agency)
- Contact information (name, title/position, telephone, email)
- Business sector (e.g., manufacturing, healthcare)
- Organization size (number of employees or annual revenue or budget)
- Are you using any of the following:
  - A private incident response (IR) service, consultant, or firm?
  - A state or local government resource or task force?
  - National Guard?If so, please provide the responding organizations' name and contact information.

**B) Incident Type** *(This selection will determine what section in layer 3 the reporting entity should fill out; reporting organizations should be able to choose more than one):*

- Business Email Compromise
- Ransomware or other extortion
- Data Theft (credentials, personally identifiable information, intellectual property, trade secrets, etc.)
- Financial theft
- Service Theft (e.g., cryptojacking)
- Denial of Service/availability attack
- Disruptive or destructive attack
- Data manipulation or integrity loss
- Branding/reputation attack
- Unauthorized access to mission critical information or systems (OT, SCADA, or ICS)
- Other

### C) Incident Information

- Assessed time span of incident (date first malicious activity occurred [if known] and date/time incident detected)
- Date reported
- Description of the incident (include as many details as are known at the time of the report, such as number of systems affected, whether data was lost, whether the incident affected any specially protected information such as health records, operational impacts, etc.)
- Description of the business impact (including anticipated down time, revenue loss, effect on customers)
- Have you reported this incident to any other federal, state, local, territorial, or tribal government agency? If so, which ones? Please provide any report, receipt, or confirmation number received.
- Is the incident on-going?
- Is this an update to a previous report?
- Is this the final report on this incident? Do you expect to file additional reports?

#### **D) Threat Actor Information**

- Threat actor communications, if any (examples include emails, email addresses, internet destinations such as domain names or TOR information, social media posts, text messages, voicemails, phone records, etc.)

## **Layer 2: Incident-specific information fields (fields change based on incident type)**

#### **Business Email Compromise:**

- Copy of email (including header information)
- Amount requested
- Amount paid
- Requested funds transfer method
- Victim bank name, address, and name(s) on account, and relevant account numbers
- Recipient bank/wallet address, contact info, routing information, and account name and number (if possible)
- Information regarding the compromise of internal accounts (e.g., mailbox takeover, email forwarding or deleting rules were created, etc.)

#### **Ransomware or Other Extortion:**

- Screenshot of ransom/extortion note or copy of the email
- Ransomware variant used (if known)
- Ransom amount demanded



- Type of currency demanded
- Did you pay? If yes, please provide:
  - Cryptocurrency address(s)
  - Cryptocurrency type(s)
  - Date of Payment (if any)
  - Transaction ID (e.g., transaction hash), if known
  - Transaction amount
  - Victim bank name, address, and name(s) on account, relevant account numbers
  - Recipient bank/wallet address, contact info, routing information, and account name and number (if possible)
- What factors led to the decision to pay the ransom?
- Did you receive the keys in return? If yes:
  - Did the keys work? What approximate percent of the files were recoverable?
- Was any data exfiltrated? If yes, please describe the type of data stolen.
  - Did the criminals leak any stolen data (to the best of your knowledge)? If so, where?
  - Did the criminals use any other pressure tactics, such as contacting clients to inform them of the compromise?

#### Data Theft:

- Type of Data Stolen:
  - Personally identifiable information for:
    - Employees
    - Customers
  - Health Records
  - Financial information for:
    - Customers (including Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard)
    - Company
  - Intellectual Property
  - Negotiation information
  - IT/OT/ICS network information
  - Employee credentials
  - Internal communications
  - Business records
  - Other non-protected, non-sensitive data
- Specific information categories within the stolen type (e.g., name, address, SSN, passwords, etc.)
- Volume of stolen information
  - For PII, number of records or individuals affected
- Value of stolen information (if known or estimable)

#### Financial Theft (e.g., banking trojans)

- Type of money stolen
- Financial method used (e.g., cryptocurrency, wire transfer, ATM withdrawals, etc.)
- Amount stolen
- Technical method of theft (e.g., banking trojan, Man in the Middle attack, etc.), if known
- Were any funds recovered?

#### Service Theft

- What type of service was stolen? (e.g., communications, computer processing power, or other function, etc.)
- How was it used? (e.g., to send spam, conduct a denial of service attack, mine cryptocurrency, etc.)
- Duration
- Impact on business operations, IT systems, or OT systems

#### Denial of Service / Availability Attack:

- Impact on business operations or IT systems
- Duration of Outage
- Were mitigation techniques used and/or successful?

#### Disruptive or Destructive Attack

- Type of system(s) affected (e.g., IT, OT, SCADA, or ICS systems)
- Extent of damage (number of endpoints, number of customers affected, etc.)
- Type of malware used to carry out the attack (if known)
- Operational impact of attack
- Estimated time until recovery

#### Data Manipulation or Integrity Loss

- Type of data affected (customer records, business records, etc.)
- Extent of damage (number of records, customers, or systems affected)
- Type of malware used to carry out the attack (if known)
- Operational impact of attack
- Estimated time until recovery

#### Branding/Reputation Attack

- What is the attack type (e.g., account takeover, social media account takeover, mirrored or fake website, etc.)
- What was the impact?
- Was recovery successful?

## Unauthorized Access to Mission Critical Information or Systems (OT, SCADA, or ICS systems)

- Type of system or data accessed
- Assessed extent of access
- Potential impact if affected system(s) were disrupted or data were stolen
- Has the adversaries' access to the affected systems been terminated? If not, when do you anticipate eliminating their access?

## Layer 3: Additional technical information fields (CISA should designate this section as optional or provide guidance as to which entities must provide this information)

Provide the following technical information associated with the incident to the extent known:

- Victim IP address or address range
- Actor group(s)
- MITRE ATT&CK categories, functions, and subfunction(s) used by malicious actors
- Malware type(s)/name(s) employed
- Technical indicators of compromise (IOCs)/indicators of attack (IOAs)
- Tactics, tools, techniques, or procedures associated with the incident not captured in the ATT&CK information
- Vulnerabilities exploited during the incident
- Technical parameters for Denial of Service incidents, including volume, duration, and type.
- Narrative: Provide additional technical details to understand the incident more fully. Is there anything we missed?

# Appendix A: Why the U.S. Government needs the information requested in the proposed Cyber Incident Reporting Form

In developing an incident reporting framework, the U.S. government has to balance several competing priorities. The government needs to collect sufficient information to achieve the goals of mandatory incident reporting while limiting the burden it places on organizations at a highly stressful time. In our recommended framework, we have attempted to strike that balance. The following sections lay out our reasoning for collecting this information through the cyber incident reporting process.

## Layer 1: General information fields applicable to all incidents

- A) **Victim Information** is needed to support all the incident reporting purposes, from trend identification to response. The fields in this section help uniquely identify the reporting entity. In addition to expected fields such as business name and sector, the proposed format also includes a question regarding whether an incident response organization is involved with the incident. Providing the name of the incident response organization, if relevant, can enable the government to work with the preliminary response entity to avoid redundancy and maximize response efficiency.
- B) **Incident Type** is critical to identifying the relevant information to be collected. It will also allow the government to more easily prioritize, categorize, store, track, and use the report for trend analysis.
- C) **Incident Information** fields provide the basic parameters of what happened during the incident to the extent known at the time of the report. The eight suggested fields in this section do not require technical expertise to answer so that organizations without access to cybersecurity expertise can still file a report.

- D) **Threat Actor Information** can assist any criminal investigation into the incident. It also enables threat analysis and trend development.

## Layer 2: Incident Specific Information Fields

We anticipate that organizations will primarily file a cyber incident report through a web portal or other on-line access point; therefore, the format can dynamically change depending on the incident types being reported and only display the fields relevant to those types.

### Business Email Compromise

- **Copy of email** (including header information) provides information critical to understanding the incident and investigating it further. It allows the government to associate the incident with a particular actor group or on-going campaign.
- **Amount requested** assists with trend analysis.
- **Amount paid** assists with trend analysis.
- **Requested funds transfer method** can help the government investigate an incident further.
- **Victim bank name, address, and name(s) on account, and relevant account numbers** can enable the government to work with the financial institution to halt the transfer of funds, or to identify, track, and possibly recover those funds if the transfer has already occurred.
- **Recipient bank/wallet address, contact info, routing information, and account name and number (if possible)** can enable the government to work with the financial institution to halt the transfer of funds, or to identify, track, and possibly recover those funds if the transfer has already occurred.
- **Information regarding the compromise of internal accounts** (e.g., mailbox takeover, email forwarding or deleting rules were created, etc.) can help the government understand the incident, connect it with other incidents, and improve indication and warning.

### Ransomware or other extortion

- **Screenshot of ransom/extortion note or copy of the email** provides information critical to understanding the incident and investigating it further. It allows the government to potentially associate the incident with a particular actor group or on-going campaign. It can help identify the nature and extent of the incident, shape the threat analysis, and support trend development.
- **Ransomware variant used** helps responders understand the incident. It can enable law enforcement and private sector entities to identify decryption keys (if they exist), which can provide an alternative to paying ransom without losing encrypted data. This information can also enable threat analysis and trend development.

- **Ransom amount demanded** can help further identify and potentially retrieve the ransom payment.
- **Type of currency demanded** can help identify and trace victim payments, and aid analysts in establishing trends about the threat.
- **Did you pay** – understanding the number of entities paying ransoms is critically important to understanding the breadth and depth of the ransomware problem, as well as knowing whether the total number of entities paying is going up or down over time.
- If you did pay, then:
  - **Cryptocurrency address(es)** are critical to the ability of blockchain analysts to track payments on the blockchain, and increase the possibility of ransom recovery.
  - **Cryptocurrency type(s)** help further identify and trace victim payments, and aid analysts in establishing trends about the threat.
  - **Date of payment** can enable law enforcement and blockchain analysts to identify, track, and potentially recover paid ransoms.
  - **Transaction ID or hash** is a unique transaction identifier. This critical piece of payment information is one of the most effective ways to identify, trace, and potentially recover a payment.
  - **Transaction amount** can help further identify and potentially retrieve the ransom payment.
  - **Victim bank name, address, and name(s) on account, and relevant account numbers** can enable law enforcement to work with the financial institution to halt the transfer of funds, or to identify and track that transfer if it has already occurred.
  - **Recipient bank/wallet address, contact info, routing information, and account name and number** can help identify malicious actors, and can aid in the tracking and potential seizure of ransom payments.
- **What factors led to the decision to pay the ransom?** This information helps the government craft policies to enable more organizations to avoid paying ransoms.
- **Did you receive the keys in return?** Can help law enforcement identify the type of ransomware utilized. If yes:
  - **Did the keys work? What approximate percent of the files were recoverable?** Can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Was any data exfiltrated?** If yes, please describe the type of data stolen. This information can help identify the severity of an incident and aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Did the criminals leak any stolen data** (to the best of your knowledge)? If so, where? This information can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Did the criminals use any other pressure tactics, such as contacting clients to inform them of the compromise?** This information can help aid in threat analysis and trend development.

## Data Theft

- **Type of data stolen:** can help identify the nature and severity of an incident and aid in threat analysis and trend development. It would enable CISA to identify the other elements of the Federal government who should receive the incident report.
- **Specific categories of information within the stolen type** (e.g., name, address, SSN, passwords, etc.) can help identify the nature and severity of an incident and aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Volume of stolen information** can help identify the severity of an incident, whether broader response activities are warranted, and aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Value of stolen information** (if known or estimable) can help identify the severity of an incident and aid in threat analysis and trend development.

## Financial Theft (e.g., banking trojans)

- **Type of money stolen** can help identify and trace victim assets, and aid analysts in establishing trends about the threat.
- **Financial method used** (e.g., cryptocurrency transfer, wire transfer, ATM withdrawals, etc.) can enable law enforcement to work with the financial institution to halt the transfer of funds, or to identify and track that transfer if it has already occurred.
- **Amount stolen** can help further identify and potentially retrieve the payment.
- **Technical method of theft** (e.g., banking trojan, Man in the Middle attack, etc.), if known, can help law enforcement investigate an incident.
- **Were any funds recovered?** Answering this question can help law enforcement investigate an incident.

## Service Theft

- **What type of service was stolen?** (e.g., communications, computer processing power, or other function, etc.) can help identify the nature and severity of an incident and aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **How was it used?** (e.g., to send spam, conduct a DDoS, mine cryptocurrency, etc.) can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Duration of outage** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Impact on business, operations, IT, or OT** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development. It helps the government categorize the incident and shape its response actions.

## Denial of Service / Availability Attack

- **Impact on business operations or IT systems**
- **Duration of outage** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Were mitigation techniques used and/or successful?** This field indicates whether the incident is on-going or whether the reporting entity has successfully managed or mitigated the availability attack.

## Disruptive or Destructive Attack

- **Type of system(s) affected** (e.g., IT, OT, SCADA, or ICS systems) can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Extent of damage** (number of endpoints, number of customers affected, etc.) can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Type of malware used to carry out the attack** (if known) can aid in law enforcement investigations, threat analysis and trend development.
- **Operational impact of attack** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Estimated time until recovery** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development. It also provides an understanding of how long the reporting entity expects the incident to last.

## Data Manipulation or Integrity Loss

- **Type of data affected** (customer records, business records, etc.) can help identify the nature and severity of an incident and aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Extent of damage** (number of records, customers, or systems affected) can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Type of malware used to carry out the attack** (if known) can aid in law enforcement investigations, threat analysis and trend development.
- **Operational impact of attack** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Estimated time until recovery** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.



## Branding/Reputation Attack

- **What is the attack type** (e.g., account takeover, social media account takeover, mirrored or fake website, etc.)
- **What was the impact?** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Was recovery successful?** This field provides insight into how severe the incident was for the reporting entity, as well as whether the incident remains on-going.

## Unauthorized Access to Mission Critical Information or Systems (OT, SCADA, or ICS systems)


- **Type of system or data accessed** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Assessed extent of access** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Potential impact if affected system(s) were disrupted or data were stolen** can help identify the severity of an incident and can aid in threat analysis and trend development.
- **Has the adversaries' access to the affected systems been terminated? If not, when do you anticipate eliminating their access?** These fields provide insight into whether the incident is on-going, whether the government should avoid communicating with the reporting entity through certain channels, and how difficult the incident is proving to be for the entity to manage.

## Layer 3: Additional technical information fields

The fields in this layer provide technical insight into the incident. Organizations will only report these fields if they have technical cybersecurity capabilities in-house, a cybersecurity provider with these capabilities, or brought in an incident responder. These fields will enable the government to make comparisons, share indicators of compromise,

- **Victim IP address or address range** can enable law enforcement and partners to identify threat actor TTPs, and will identify the access points that need to be secured.
- **Actor group(s) when relevant**, can help law enforcement and other responders pinpoint attack methods and possible decryption keys, when relevant. It also provides a basis for further investigation.
- **MITRE ATT&CK categories, functions, and subfunction(s) used by malicious actors.** ATT&CK is a curated knowledge base that tracks cyber adversary tactics and techniques used by threat actors across the entire attack lifecycle. The framework can be used to collect data about an incident, and also to strengthen an organization's security posture in the aftermath of an attack
- **Malware type(s)/name(s) employed** can aid in law enforcement investigations, threat analysis and trend development.
- **Technical indicators of compromise (IOCs)/indicators of attack (IOAs) associated with the incident**, like copies of identified malware, phishing messages, and identified attacker infrastructure, can help law enforcement investigate an incident. It can enable the government to warn other companies what to watch for to prevent the same incident from happening to another company.
- **Tactics, tools, techniques, or procedures associated with the incident not captured in the ATT&CK information** can help build a better understanding of the threat, and account for the fact that ATT&CK is constantly being updated.
- **Vulnerabilities exploited during the incident** allows investigators to understand whether the adversary used well-known tools and techniques or whether the adversary used novel capabilities. This information would also contribute to trend analysis and prioritization of patching.
- **Narrative** allows victims or responding entities to include any other information that they might deem important.

Layer	Section	Field	Example
<b>Layer 1: General Information Fields</b> <b>Applicable to All Incidents</b>	<b>A (Victim Information)</b>	Organization name and other identifying information	Acme Corp (Formerly A Company Making Everything LLC)
		Entity type	Corporation
		Contact information (name, title/position, telephone, email)	Alice Bobson Incident Response Lead
		Business sector	Manufacturing
		Organization size	2,523 employees; \$500 million in annual revenue
		Are you using any of the following: A private incident response (IR) service, consultant, or firm? A state or local government resource or task force? National Guard? If so, please provide the responding organizations' name and contact information.	Yes, we are using IncidentResponseCompanyA. We have also filed a report with the local FBI field office, who we are having weekly calls with to brief on the current status of the investigation.
	<b>B (Incident Type)</b>	Data Theft (credentials; personally identifiable information; intellectual property; trade secrets; etc)	Ransomware or other extortion
	<b>C (Incident Information)</b>	Assessed time span of incident (When the first intrusion may have occurred, when the incident was detected)	February 10, 2022 - February 18, 2022
		Date reported	February 19, 2022
		Description of the incident (include as many details as are known at the time of the report, such as number of systems affected, whether data was lost, whether the incident affected any specially protected information such as health records, operational impacts, etc.)	Attackers are believed to have first gained access on February 10th, 2022 using CVE-2018-13382 to gain access to our VPN Appliance. From this access, the attackers were able to remotely connect to our network and move laterally to our Active Directory server. Ransom operations began on February 18, 2022. Our initial investigation identified 35 business critical servers were impacted by the ransomware and data from our central storage server had been exfiltrated. Data on our storage server does not include customer information and the contents obtained are believed to be related to business and manufacturing processes used here at Acme Corp.
		Description of the business impact (including anticipated down time, revenue loss, effect on customers)	Due to the disruption of key servers, production has been halted at both of our manufacturing facilities. We are expecting this incident to result in at least 4 days of production downtime. We have issued a notice to our customers informing them of the breach and that their information is not believed to have been stolen, however, we cannot effectively measure reputation impact.
		Have you reported this incident to any other Federal, State, Local, Territorial, or Tribal government agency? If so, which ones?	Yes, this has been reported to the FBI.
		Is the incident on-going?	At this time, we do not believe the ransomware actors are still present on our network. We have conducted a company wide password reset, removed the VPN appliance and are actively working to further verify the eviction of the actor.
		Is this an update to a previous report?	No
		Is this the final report on this incident?	Additional reports may be filed if we discover additional details or inaccuracies are found in our current understanding of the situation
		Or Do you expect to file additional reports?	

Layer 2: Incident Specific Information	D (Threat Actor Information)	Threat actor communications, if any (examples include emails, email addresses, internet destinations such as domain names or TOR information, social media posts, text messages, voicemails, phone records, etc.)	A text file, containing recovery instructions, was identified on each of the ransomed servers. In this note, the actor instructed us to email "LegitBankingSyndicate@Example.com" to discuss decryption. In coordination with our incident response provider, legal team and senior leadership, we contacted the actor who requested we send "\$2kk USD to the Bitcoin wallet 1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa". Given the high ransom demand and our ability to recover from backups, we decided not to pay the ransom. A copy of this email thread has been provided to our FBI contact.
	Ransomware or Other Extortion	<p>Screenshot of ransomware/extortion note or copy of the email</p>  <p>Ransomware variant used (if known)</p> <p>Type of currency demanded</p> <p>Did you pay? If yes please provide:</p> <p>Cryptocurrency address(es)</p> <p>Cryptocurrency type(s)</p> <p>Date of payment (if any)</p> <p>Transaction ID if known</p> <p>Transaction amount</p> <p>Victim Bank Name, address, name(s) on account, and relevant account numbers</p> <p>Recipient bank/wallet address, contact information, routing information, and account name and number (if possible)</p> <p>What factors led to the decision to pay the ransom?</p> <p>Did you receive the keys in return? If yes:</p> <p>Did the keys work?</p> <p>What approximate percentage of the files were recoverable?</p> <p>Was any data exfiltrated? If yes:</p> <p>Please describe the type of data stolen.</p> <p>Did the criminals leak any stolen data (to the best of your knowledge)?</p> <p>If so, where?</p>	<p>All files on each host in the network have been encrypted with a strong algorithm.</p> <p>Backups have been destroyed, Shadow copies have been destroyed. Antivirus companies, researchers, IT specialists, and no other persons can help you encrypt the data.</p> <p>DO NOT RESET OR SHUTDOWN - files may be damaged. DO NOT DELETE readme files.</p> <p>We exclusively have decryption software for your situation.</p> <p>To confirm our honest intentions, send 2 different random files and you will get it decrypted. It can be from different computers on your network to be sure that one key decrypts everything. 2 files we unlock for free</p> <p>To get info (decrypt your files) contact us at LegitBankingSyndicate@Example.com</p> <p>You will receive btc address for payment in the reply letter</p> <p>LBS</p> <p>Hidden Tear</p> <p>US Dollar</p> <p>No</p> <p>Bitcoin</p> <p>1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa</p> <p>Recovery of assets</p> <p>Yes, Internal business and manufacturing process documentation</p> <p>No, it does not appear that this ransomware group uses a dedicated leak site (DLS) in which our data was posted</p>

Layer 3: Additional Technical Information Fields	Data Theft	Did the criminals use any other pressure tactics, such as contacting clients to inform them of the compromise?	
		Type of Data Stolen	Intellectual property
		Specific categories of information within the stolen type	Internal business and manufacturing process documentation
		Volume of stolen information	35Gb
		For PII, number of records or individuals affected	0
		Value of stolen information (if known or estimable)	
		Victim IP Address or Address Range	240.129.21.0/24
		Actor group(s)	LegitBankingSyndicate
		MITRE ATT&CK categories, functions, and subfunction(s) used by malicious actors	T1190, T1059, T1136, T1562, T1070, T1018
		Malware type(s)/name(s) employed	LegitBankingSyndicateRansomware
		Technical indicators of compromise (IOCs)/indicators of attack (IOAs)	Ransomware Payload: aae523c5b488302020067109ab5ea04a98974766e2ca19157f3986a6cbe20a2e
		Tactics, Tools, Techniques, or Procedures associated with the incident not captured in the ATT&CK information	
		Vulnerabilities exploited during the incident	CVE-2018-13382
		Technical parameters for Denial of Service incidents, including volume, duration, and type.	
		Narrative: Provide additional technical details to understand the incident more fully. Is there anything we missed?	