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AI and NC3
Pioneering action-oriented efforts to explore how advanced AI capabilities will be integrated into nuclear command, control, and communications
AI Antitrust and National Security
Exploring how to more effectively account for national security considerations in AI antitrust cases while respecting precedent, scope, and the core principles of antitrust law
AI Risk Reduction Initiative
Assessing the emerging risks and opportunities of AI foundation models and developing risk reduction strategies
AI Chip Export Control Initiative
Safeguarding U.S. national competitiveness by closing critical compliance and enforcement gaps
AI Risk Barometer
Measuring national security professionals’ perceptions of AI futures through a technically-informed survey
CATALINK
Preventing the onset or escalation of conflict by building a resilient global communications system
Energy FIRST
Powering U.S. and allied security & prosperity through a resilient energy future
Ransomware Task Force (RTF)
Combating the ransomware threat with a cross-sector approach
Religious Voices and Responsible AI
Engaging religious communities on safe and beneficial AI
SL5 Task Force
Strengthening AI security through a multistakeholder approach
UnDisruptable27
Driving more resilient lifeline critical infrastructure for our communities
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supply chain
Report
Hardware that is Less Untrusted: Open Source Down to the Silicon
In an essay out of the workshop "Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink," Ron Minnich argues "We can not build on a foundation that is compromised at all levels. There is no visibility into the system's behavior. The existing model assumes perfect software: 'Trust, but don't verify." We need to start anew, from the gates, and work our way up.
CATALINK
,
central processing unit
,
chip
,
computing
,
CPU
,
firmware
,
hardware
,
IO chips
,
memory chip
,
motherboard
,
NC3
,
open-source
,
PC
,
personal computer
,
silicon
,
software
,
supply chain
,
UV
June 9, 2020
Report
An Examination of the US NC3 Industrial and Innovation Base
Colonel Elvert Gardner examines the U.S. industrial and innovation base, identifying key factors that may militate against innovation and against timely and efficient supply in the US industrial base.
Aquisition
,
cybersecurity
,
Department of Defense
,
DOD
,
human capital
,
industrial base
,
innovation
,
modernization
,
National Defense Authorization Act
,
national security
,
nuclear
,
stability
,
supply chain
,
United States
June 20, 2019
Report
Counter Nuclear Command, Control and Communications
This report by Carol Ann Jones seeks to introduce the nuclear command, control, and stability framework; collect open source NC3 system information on the eight declared nuclear nations to fill in the framework; describe counter NC3 activities; and introduce a few alternate NC3 approaches that may contribute to nuclear stability.
anti-satellite
,
bias
,
C3
,
command and control
,
communication
,
complexity
,
electromagnetic pulse
,
launch authority
,
modernization
,
NC3
,
Nuclear Posture Review
,
special operation
,
stability
,
strike
,
supply chain
,
threshold
,
vulnerability
,
warhead
,
warning
November 7, 2019
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