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AI and NC3
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Exploring how to more effectively account for national security considerations in AI antitrust cases while respecting precedent, scope, and the core principles of antitrust law
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NC3
Podcast
The End of Survivability?
In this episode of The Fourth Leg, Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes are joined by guest Daryl Press, who focuses on the growing threats to nuclear command and control and communication (NC3) systems around the world.
global stability
,
NC3
,
nuclear command
,
nuclear control
,
nuclear risk
,
strategic stability
,
vulnerabilities
,
vulnerable NC3
October 17, 2019
Podcast
Elements of Caution and Prudence
In this episode of The Fourth Leg, Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes sit down with Avner Cohen to explore Israel's NC3 profile.
Israel
,
Middle East
,
NC3
,
NC3 architecture
,
nuclear command
,
nuclear control
,
nuclear weapon state
October 10, 2019
Podcast
An Altogether Different Set of Challenges
Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes are joined by Feroz Hassan Khan for a conversation on the nuclear command, control, and communications of Pakistan.
delegation
,
NC3
,
NC3 architecture
,
nuclear deterrent
,
nuclear war
,
Pakistan
September 26, 2019
Podcast
When and Why Cede Nuclear Authority
In this segment, Dr. Vipin Narang joins Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes to challenge the delegative/assertive binary, arguing that, while conceptually important, it has hamstrung our thinking of regional powers’ NC3 by forcing them into one bin or another when it is in fact a time-dependent spectrum: all states delegate—that is, cede the ability to use nuclear weapons, irrespective of the authority to do so—at some point.
assertive
,
delegative
,
hardware
,
NC3
,
NC3 architecture
,
nuclear command
,
nuclear control
,
regional powers
,
software
September 18, 2019
Podcast
United Kingdom: Nuclear Weapon, Command, Control, and Communications
In this episode, Rear Admiral John Gower joins Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes to discuss the UK nuclear weapon command, control, and communications architecture. He goes into detail on the multiple communication paths, frequencies, fall-back systems, and encryption needed to continuously enable the UK's Prime Minister to act on a nuclear launch decision.
crisis communications
,
encryption
,
NC3
,
nuclear launch
,
nuclear weapons
,
systems
,
United Kingdom
September 12, 2019
Podcast
China, Technology, and the Security Dilemma
In this episode, Elsa Kania joins Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes to assess how emerging technologies—including artificial intelligence, cloud computing, fifth-generation telecommunications, and quantum communications—may affect China’s NC3.
5G
,
artificial inteligence
,
China
,
cloud computing
,
complexity
,
NC3
,
quantum
September 5, 2019
Podcast
Questioning Unitary Command: Nuclear Launch Authority and the N-Person Problem
In this segment, Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes are joined by Dr. Alex Wellerstein, who sketches a framework for thinking about how concentrated nuclear use authority should be at the top.
NC3
,
nuclear command
,
nuclear control
,
nuclear use authority
,
nuclear war
,
nuclear weapons states
August 8, 2019
Podcast
Deterred by the Uncertainties
In this episode, guest Fiona Cunningham joins hosts Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes to describe the origins of China’s NC3 system and its primary role in supporting China’s land-based missile force.
China
,
early warning systems
,
missile
,
NC3
,
nuclear command
,
nuclear war
,
submarines
July 29, 2019
Podcast
The Curse of Flexibility
In this segment, Nancy Leveson joins Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes to make the case that using conservative techniques and avoiding unnecessarily complex software in critical functions in NC3 systems circumvented nuclear catastrophe in the past.
complexity
,
NC3
,
nuclear command
,
risk management
,
software
July 25, 2019
Podcast
Is the Enemy in the System?
Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes sit down with Dr. Jon Lindsay, who makes the case that the cybersecurity of nuclear command, control, and communications is a pressing concern.
cyber
,
cybersecurity
,
NC3
,
nuclear command
,
nuclear war
,
offensive cyber
,
risk
June 20, 2019
Podcast
Complexity is the Enemy of Security
Philip Reiner is joined by guest Eric Grosse, who makes the case that for information security at extreme scales, complexity is the enemy of security. Using the example of Gmail, he calls for a return to basics. "For the very highest security needs such as NC3, we ought to return to basics and harden small-scale systems. And we ought to do it as a joint effort, even between adversaries.”
complexity
,
Information Security
,
NC3
,
nuclear command
,
nuclear communications
,
security
May 30, 2019
Podcast
The System Can’t Be Perfect
In this podcast, Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes sit down with Dr. John Harvey, who asserts that the US NC3 system "must seek vastly improved senior leader conferencing capabilities to support decisions that go beyond what some of us call the Cold War’s “multiple choice test”—that is, which major attack option to execute."
cold war
,
conferencing
,
crisis communications
,
NC3
,
nuclear communication
May 24, 2019
Podcast
Grand Tactics and the Thin Skin of Civilization
In the first episode of The Fourth Leg, Philip Reiner and Peter Hayes sit down with Dr. Paul Bracken for an overview of NC3 tactics and global stability.
C3I
,
entanglement
,
global stability
,
inadvertent escalation
,
NC3
,
nuclear command
,
nuclear war
May 13, 2019
Report
The AES Project: Any Lessons for NC3?
Thomas Berson details how lessons from the Advanced Encryption Standard Competition can aid the development of international NC3 components and even be mirrored in the creation of a CATALINK community.
advanced encryption standard
,
AES
,
Anagram
,
blockchain
,
CATALINK
,
cryptography
,
encryption
,
NC3
,
NIST
,
standards
June 23, 2020
Report
Hardware that is Less Untrusted: Open Source Down to the Silicon
In an essay out of the workshop "Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink," Ron Minnich argues "We can not build on a foundation that is compromised at all levels. There is no visibility into the system's behavior. The existing model assumes perfect software: 'Trust, but don't verify." We need to start anew, from the gates, and work our way up.
CATALINK
,
central processing unit
,
chip
,
computing
,
CPU
,
firmware
,
hardware
,
IO chips
,
memory chip
,
motherboard
,
NC3
,
open-source
,
PC
,
personal computer
,
silicon
,
software
,
supply chain
,
UV
June 9, 2020
Report
Communication Disruption Attacks on NC3
In an essay out of the workshop "Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink," Paul Bracken argues, "in a nuclear world we should be careful about attacking enemy communications because doing so leads to greater risks of uncontrolled escalation. The worst possible situation is the one the United States is now in, that is, to not be clear in our own minds about what we are doing when it comes to disrupting communications.”
CATALINK
,
communication
,
communication attacks
,
electromagnetic pulse
,
electronic warfare
,
escalation
,
military
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
red line
,
retaliation
,
strike
,
target
,
targeting
,
United States
,
vulnerability
May 28, 2020
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