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Building Communications Norms Across Nuclear C2

Report

Building Communications Norms Across Nuclear C2

Dr. Salma Shaheen stresses the importance of establishing new norms, constructing new practices, and securing reliant communications between nuclear-armed states before a potential crisis. Shaheen reaffirms the need for a direct communication link between global leaders to facilitate quick and efficient communications between nuclear-armed states — a capability she cites as essential for escalation control and nuclear weapons reduction, with a direct impact on crisis aversion and thus global security.
CATALINK, communication, control, crisis, crisis management, escalation, history, hotlines, NC3, nuclear, nuclear security, nuclear weapon, nuclear-use, secure communications
November 24, 2020
Nuclear Hotlines: Origins, Evolution, Applications

Report

Nuclear Hotlines: Origins, Evolution, Applications

Dr. Steven E. Miller gives an overview of experiences to-date with nuclear hotlines. He reviews the history of the US-Russia hotline, describes the ways that hotlines can be used or misused, and charts how the hotline concept has evolved and propagated to help states manage international crises. Hotlines are important, if imperfect, tools for avoiding nuclear conflict.
CATALINK, crisis, crisis management, de-escalation, escalation, history, hotlines, NC3, nuclear, nuclear security, nuclear weapon, nuclear-use, secure communications
October 28, 2020
Formal Methods for NC3 Systems

Report

Formal Methods for NC3 Systems

What if we told you there is a very concrete way of updating and securing the most complex NC3 systems? Adam Wick makes the case for future NC3 protocol descriptions "to include not only a broad description of the protocol and its goals, but also an executable specification of the protocol. He continues, "Given the sensitivity of these systems, we believe that the use of proof is critical."
communication, control, crisis management, formal methods, mathematics, NC3, nuclear, nuclear security, nuclear weapons, nuclear-use
September 17, 2020
Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink

AAR, Report

Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink

"Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink" outlines a vision for a novel “hotline” system that would enable secure and verifiable communications between leaders during nuclear crises and other high-stakes scenarios.
CATALINK, complexity, crisis communications, hardware, hotline, nuclear
May 14, 2020
When machine learning comes to nuclear communication systems

Op-ed

When machine learning comes to nuclear communication systems

In an op-ed for C4ISRNET, Philip Reiner, Alexa Wehsener and M. Nina Miller underline the importance of credible NC3 systems.
CATALINK, crisis communications, machine learning, NC3, nuclear, stability
April 30, 2020
The Real Value of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command and Control

Op-ed

The Real Value of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command and Control

In an article in War on the Rocks, Philip Reiner and Alexa Wehsener make the case for a nuanced discussion about the integration of artificial intelligence in nuclear command, control, and communication systems. 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, NC3, nuclear, stability
November 4, 2019
DOD Establishes the Office of Strategic Capital

Fact Sheet

DOD Establishes the Office of Strategic Capital

On Thursday, December 1, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin established the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), defining it as an “organization that will help build an enduring technological advantage by partnering with private capital providers.”
To the Point of Failure: Identifying Failure Points for Crisis Communications Systems

Report

To the Point of Failure: Identifying Failure Points for Crisis Communications Systems

Crisis communication systems can fail in a variety of ways. To shed light on the many different failures that degrade and undermine such systems, this report identifies four categories of pathways to failure: operational failures, adversarial failures, accidental failures and institutional failures. Each category is made up of specific types of failures, investigated in further detail in the following sections of this report.
Mapping the Ransomware Payment Ecosystem: A Comprehensive Visualization of the Process and Participants

Report

Mapping the Ransomware Payment Ecosystem: A Comprehensive Visualization of the Process and Participants

Central to our ability to mitigate the threat of ransomware is the development of a common understanding of the actors, stakeholders, processes, and information, both required for and produced during the ransomware payment process. Yet, when we began this work, such a picture did not exist. We undertook this effort to fill that gap.
Plan maestro de defensa contra los programas de secuestro

Report

Plan maestro de defensa contra los programas de secuestro

En respuesta a la acción 3.1.1 del Informe del Grupo de Trabajo sobre Programas de Secuestro, en la cual se exhorta a las organizaciones de ciberseguridad a establecer un marco claro y accionable para la mitigación, la respuesta y la recuperación ante programas de secuestro, el Grupo de Trabajo encargado de elaborar un plan de defensa contra los programas de secuestro formuló un plan maestro que abarca un subconjunto de salvaguardias esenciales de ciberhigiene seleccionadas de los controles críticos de seguridad del Centro para la Seguridad de Internet (CIS Controls®) v8.

CATALINK