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AI and NC3
Pioneering action-oriented efforts to explore how advanced AI capabilities will be integrated into nuclear command, control, and communications
AI Antitrust and National Security
Exploring how to more effectively account for national security considerations in AI antitrust cases while respecting precedent, scope, and the core principles of antitrust law
AI Risk Reduction Initiative
Assessing the emerging risks and opportunities of AI foundation models and developing risk reduction strategies
AI Chip Export Control Initiative
Safeguarding U.S. national competitiveness by closing critical compliance and enforcement gaps
AI Risk Barometer
Measuring national security professionals’ perceptions of AI futures through a technically-informed survey
CATALINK
Preventing the onset or escalation of conflict by building a resilient global communications system
Energy FIRST
Powering U.S. and allied security & prosperity through a resilient energy future
Ransomware Task Force (RTF)
Combating the ransomware threat with a cross-sector approach
Religious Voices and Responsible AI
Engaging religious communities on safe and beneficial AI
SL5 Task Force
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UnDisruptable27
Driving more resilient lifeline critical infrastructure for our communities
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early warning
Report
Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems
Leonid Ryabikhin argues that distrust, misunderstanding and concern prevail in US/NATO and Russia relations, increasing the risk of unintended or accidental conflict. He concludes, "The absence of contacts between the United States and Russian military and the failure to reach new agreements while existing agreements collapse worsens an already dangerous situation."
ballistic missile
,
biological
,
early warning
,
Ministry of Defence
,
modernization
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear forces
,
radar
,
reduction
,
Russia
,
Soviet Union
,
stability
,
submarine
,
superpower
July 11, 2019
Report
Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India
M.V. Ramana and Lauren Borja analyze the state of nuclear command and control in India, concluding that the state of Indian NC3 “has been shaped by an ongoing rivalry between civilian authorities and the military."
accident
,
communication
,
control
,
decision-making
,
defense
,
delivery vehicle
,
deterrence
,
early warning
,
India
,
military
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
Pakistan
,
stability
,
submarine
,
survivability
,
United States
,
wargaming
August 1, 2019
Report
Emerging Technologies, Emerging Challenges: The Potential Employment of New Technologies in Future PLA NC3
Elsa Kania assesses how emerging technologies—including artificial intelligence, cloud computing, fifth-generation telecommunications, and quantum communications—may affect China’s NC3. Kania concludes: “Although certain of these technologies could enhance China’s confidence in its NC3 in ways that may prove stabilizing, there are also reasons for concern that the potential introduction of such complex, untested technologies could also create new risks and exacerbate the threat of miscalculation.”
5G
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AI
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China
,
cyberspace
,
early warning
,
fiber-optic
,
fifth generation
,
force posture
,
hypersonic
,
jamming
,
missile penetration
,
mobile missile
,
modernization
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
PLA
,
quantum
,
radio
,
rapid reaction
,
risk
,
rocket force
,
satellite
,
second artillery force
,
secure
,
secure communications
,
stability
,
submarine
,
super low frequency
,
targeting
,
technologies
,
underwater communications
,
very low frequency
,
war-fighting
September 5, 2019
Report
For Better or for Worse: The Future of C3I Entanglement
James Acton evaluates the risk of inadvertent escalation arising from attacks on dual-use (nuclear and conventional warfare) command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities in a conventional war because such attacks would degrade the target’s nuclear command-and-control system.
anti-satellite
,
ballistic missile
,
boost-glide
,
C3I
,
capabilities
,
cyber
,
defense
,
dyad
,
early warning
,
geopolitical
,
high-precision munition
,
hypersonic
,
incidental attacks
,
intelligence
,
launch under attack
,
military
,
nuclear
,
orbits
,
radar
,
stability
,
strategic
,
war
,
warfighting
November 21, 2019
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