Archive

submarine

DPRK’s NC3 System

DPRK’s NC3 System

Dr. Myeongguk Cheon describes what is known about North Korea’s NC3 system. Cheon concludes, “Regarding the DPRK’s NC3 system, however, many questions remain unanswered, even though it is clearly identified who has the final approval authority and what forces operates delivery systems for the employment of nuclear weapons.”

artillery, assembly, atomic bomb, authority, autocracy, delegation, delivery system, explosion, fiber-optic, military, NC3, New Year, North Korea, nuclear, South Korea, submarine

June 6, 2019

Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems

Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems

Leonid Ryabikhin argues that distrust, misunderstanding and concern prevail in US/NATO and Russia relations, increasing the risk of unintended or accidental conflict. He concludes, "The absence of contacts between the United States and Russian military and the failure to reach new agreements while existing agreements collapse worsens an already dangerous situation."

ballistic missile, biological, early warning, Ministry of Defence, modernization, NC3, nuclear, nuclear forces, radar, reduction, Russia, Soviet Union, stability, submarine, superpower

July 11, 2019

Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India

Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India

M.V. Ramana and Lauren Borja analyze the state of nuclear command and control in India, concluding that the state of Indian NC3 “has been shaped by an ongoing rivalry between civilian authorities and the military."

accident, communication, control, decision-making, defense, delivery vehicle, deterrence, early warning, India, military, NC3, nuclear, Pakistan, stability, submarine, survivability, United States, wargaming

August 1, 2019

Emerging Technologies, Emerging Challenges: The Potential Employment of New Technologies in Future PLA NC3

Emerging Technologies, Emerging Challenges: The Potential Employment of New Technologies in Future PLA NC3

Elsa Kania assesses how emerging technologies—including artificial intelligence, cloud computing, fifth-generation telecommunications, and quantum communications—may affect China’s NC3. Kania concludes: “Although certain of these technologies could enhance China’s confidence in its NC3 in ways that may prove stabilizing, there are also reasons for concern that the potential introduction of such complex, untested technologies could also create new risks and exacerbate the threat of miscalculation.”

September 5, 2019

United Kingdom: Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, and Communications

United Kingdom: Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, and Communications

Rear Admiral John Gower argues that the UK Nuclear Weapon Command Control and Communications (UK NC3) architecture is designed and operated to support SSBN strategic nuclear deterrence in all foreseeable circumstances from peacetime to nuclear conflict. "Through multiple paths and frequencies, fall-back and alternative systems, and with dedicated and unique encryption and processes, it delivers continuous availability for the Prime Minister should a decision to launch be made," he says.

August 15, 2019

A New Framework for Thinking about Regional NC3

A New Framework for Thinking about Regional NC3

“All states delegate—that is, cede the ability to use nuclear weapons, irrespective of the authority to do so—at some point. The question is when," concludes Vipin Narang.

assured retaliation, ballistic missiles, civil-military, deterrent, fog of war, information environment, No First Use, nuclear, permissive action link, personnel procedures, positive control, redundant, reliability, stability, strategic, submarine

September 19, 2019