Archive

strategic

NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability: A Global Overview

NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability: A Global Overview

In a conventional conflict between the United States and China or Russia, each belligerent might attack the other's command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities to gain a war-fighting advantage. However, because a number of...

cold war, command, communication, control, emerging technologies, NC3, NPT, nuclear, PALS, permissive action link, stability, strategic

May 6, 2019

NC3 in a Multipolar Nuclear World: Big Structures and Large Processes

NC3 in a Multipolar Nuclear World: Big Structures and Large Processes

In this essay, Paul Bracken analyzes the big structures and large processes of nuclear multipolarity. A framework for analyzing this global system is developed, one made up of national command and control plus the "system dynamics" of their interlinked behavior. The paper underscores how advanced technologies — cyberwar, drones, and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) — affects NC3.

anti-satellite, cold war, command, communication, control, cyberwar, drones, Europe, missile defense, NATO, NC3, Non-Proliferation, nuclear, stability, strategic, Strategy, weapon

May 14, 2019

U.S. Nuclear Command and Control for the 21st Century

U.S. Nuclear Command and Control for the 21st Century

Dr. John Harvey calls for fixing the legacy NC2 system, including the so-called “thin line” architecture, to address Cold War-era nuclear scenarios which have not yet gone away, developing an NC2 concept and associated architecture to address “modern” nuclear conflict, and generating a plan to field it over the next 10-15 years.

21st century, alert posture, cold war, command, communication, conflict, control, deterrence, NC2, NC3, nuclear, resilience, stability, strategic, Strategy, sustainment

May 23, 2019

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: U.S. Country Profile

In "Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: U.S. Country Profile," Jeffrey Larsen argues that, for the last 75 years, the deterrence forces of the United States have relied on the credible threat of nuclear weapons use to prevent adversarial attacks.

authority, C2, command, communication, control, deterrence, NC3, nuclear, policy, president, stability, strategic, Strategy, United States, US, World War II

August 22, 2019

The Non-State Dimensions of Nuclear Command, Control, Communications

The Non-State Dimensions of Nuclear Command, Control, Communications

Dr. Gary Ackerman introduces how violent non-state actors (VSNAs) may approach the command and control of nuclear weapons and suggests that understanding the complexity presented by VNSA NC3 entails considering traditional concepts of state NC3 and dynamics that are unique to non-state actors driven by a variety of goals and confronting a different set of constraints from those of states.

August 29, 2019

A New Framework for Thinking about Regional NC3

A New Framework for Thinking about Regional NC3

“All states delegate—that is, cede the ability to use nuclear weapons, irrespective of the authority to do so—at some point. The question is when," concludes Vipin Narang.

assured retaliation, ballistic missiles, civil-military, deterrent, fog of war, information environment, No First Use, nuclear, permissive action link, personnel procedures, positive control, redundant, reliability, stability, strategic, submarine

September 19, 2019

What Do We Want From the Nuclear Command and Control System?

What Do We Want From the Nuclear Command and Control System?

In this essay from IST and the Nautilus Institute, Paul Davis suggests that U.S. NC3 modernization “should place increased emphasis on assuring control, avoiding accidents, and avoiding ill-informed or unwise employment of nuclear weapons.”

authorization, deterrence, first strike, intelligence, launch under attack, limited war, modernization, NC3, nuclear policy, redundancy, retaliation, stability, strategic, warfighting, zero-tolerance

October 24, 2019

For Better or for Worse: The Future of C3I Entanglement

For Better or for Worse: The Future of C3I Entanglement

James Acton evaluates the risk of inadvertent escalation arising from attacks on dual-use (nuclear and conventional warfare) command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities in a conventional war because such attacks would degrade the target’s nuclear command-and-control system.

November 21, 2019