Skip to content
Sign Up for Our Newsletter
About
Close About
Open About
About the Institute for Security and Technology
Our Team
Board Of Directors
Careers
Contact Us
Featured Events
Cyber Policy Awards
Critical Effect DC
Projects
Close Projects
Open Projects
AI and NC3
Pioneering action-oriented efforts to explore how advanced AI capabilities will be integrated into nuclear command, control, and communications
AI Antitrust and National Security
Exploring how to more effectively account for national security considerations in AI antitrust cases while respecting precedent, scope, and the core principles of antitrust law
AI Risk Reduction Initiative
Assessing the emerging risks and opportunities of AI foundation models and developing risk reduction strategies
AI Chip Export Control Initiative
Safeguarding U.S. national competitiveness by closing critical compliance and enforcement gaps
AI Risk Barometer
Measuring national security professionals’ perceptions of AI futures through a technically-informed survey
CATALINK
Preventing the onset or escalation of conflict by building a resilient global communications system
Energy FIRST
Powering U.S. and allied security & prosperity through a resilient energy future
Ransomware Task Force (RTF)
Combating the ransomware threat with a cross-sector approach
Religious Voices and Responsible AI
Engaging religious communities on safe and beneficial AI
SL5 Task Force
Strengthening AI security through a multistakeholder approach
UnDisruptable27
Driving more resilient lifeline critical infrastructure for our communities
All Projects
» Explore all of IST's projects, past and current
Focus Areas
Future of Digital Security
Geopolitics of Technology
Innovation and Catastrophic Risk
Events
Insights
Contact
Search
Donate
Archive
Report
Report
Hotline Between Two Koreas: Status, Limitations and Future Tasks
In this paper, Moon Chung-in and Boo Seung-Chan provide historical context on the hotlines linking South and North Korea and point to the lessons that can be learned from the decades-long effort.
CATALINK
,
communication
,
communication link
,
crisis
,
crisis management
,
escalation
,
history
,
hotlines
,
Innovation and Catastrophic Risk
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear security
,
nuclear weapon
,
nuclear weapon states
,
nuclear weapons
,
nuclear-use
,
secure communications
December 17, 2020
Report
Building Communications Norms Across Nuclear C2
Dr. Salma Shaheen stresses the importance of establishing new norms, constructing new practices, and securing reliant communications between nuclear-armed states before a potential crisis. Shaheen reaffirms the need for a direct communication link between global leaders to facilitate quick and efficient communications between nuclear-armed states — a capability she cites as essential for escalation control and nuclear weapons reduction, with a direct impact on crisis aversion and thus global security.
CATALINK
,
communication
,
control
,
crisis
,
crisis management
,
escalation
,
history
,
hotlines
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear security
,
nuclear weapon
,
nuclear-use
,
secure communications
November 24, 2020
Report
Nuclear Hotlines: Origins, Evolution, Applications
Dr. Steven E. Miller gives an overview of experiences to-date with nuclear hotlines. He reviews the history of the US-Russia hotline, describes the ways that hotlines can be used or misused, and charts how the hotline concept has evolved and propagated to help states manage international crises. Hotlines are important, if imperfect, tools for avoiding nuclear conflict.
CATALINK
,
crisis
,
crisis management
,
de-escalation
,
escalation
,
history
,
hotlines
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear security
,
nuclear weapon
,
nuclear-use
,
secure communications
October 28, 2020
Report
Formal Methods for NC3 Systems
What if we told you there is a very concrete way of updating and securing the most complex NC3 systems? Adam Wick makes the case for future NC3 protocol descriptions "to include not only a broad description of the protocol and its goals, but also an executable specification of the protocol. He continues, "Given the sensitivity of these systems, we believe that the use of proof is critical."
communication
,
control
,
crisis management
,
formal methods
,
mathematics
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear security
,
nuclear weapons
,
nuclear-use
September 17, 2020
AAR
,
Report
Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink
"Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink" outlines a vision for a novel “hotline” system that would enable secure and verifiable communications between leaders during nuclear crises and other high-stakes scenarios.
CATALINK
,
complexity
,
crisis communications
,
hardware
,
hotline
,
nuclear
May 14, 2020
Report
Pay Attention
In a joint CNAS and IST report, Alexa Wehsener analyzes the effect of digital technologies on the monetization of attention.
attention
,
cognition
,
democracy
,
digital cognition
August 19, 2020
Report
Divided Against Itself
In Divided Against Itself, an installment of the ongoing series from IST and the Center for a New American Security examining the elements and potential implications of digital threats to democracy over the next ten years, M. Nina Miller explores how new technologies can amplify divisions and erode trust in public institutions.
democracy
,
identity
,
ideology
,
polarization
July 8, 2020
Report
The AES Project: Any Lessons for NC3?
Thomas Berson details how lessons from the Advanced Encryption Standard Competition can aid the development of international NC3 components and even be mirrored in the creation of a CATALINK community.
advanced encryption standard
,
AES
,
Anagram
,
blockchain
,
CATALINK
,
cryptography
,
encryption
,
NC3
,
NIST
,
standards
June 23, 2020
Report
Hardware that is Less Untrusted: Open Source Down to the Silicon
In an essay out of the workshop "Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink," Ron Minnich argues "We can not build on a foundation that is compromised at all levels. There is no visibility into the system's behavior. The existing model assumes perfect software: 'Trust, but don't verify." We need to start anew, from the gates, and work our way up.
CATALINK
,
central processing unit
,
chip
,
computing
,
CPU
,
firmware
,
hardware
,
IO chips
,
memory chip
,
motherboard
,
NC3
,
open-source
,
PC
,
personal computer
,
silicon
,
software
,
supply chain
,
UV
June 9, 2020
Report
Communication Disruption Attacks on NC3
In an essay out of the workshop "Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink," Paul Bracken argues, "in a nuclear world we should be careful about attacking enemy communications because doing so leads to greater risks of uncontrolled escalation. The worst possible situation is the one the United States is now in, that is, to not be clear in our own minds about what we are doing when it comes to disrupting communications.”
CATALINK
,
communication
,
communication attacks
,
electromagnetic pulse
,
electronic warfare
,
escalation
,
military
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
red line
,
retaliation
,
strike
,
target
,
targeting
,
United States
,
vulnerability
May 28, 2020
AAR
,
Report
NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability: A Global Overview
In a conventional conflict between the United States and China or Russia, each belligerent might attack the other's command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities to gain a war-fighting advantage. However, because a number of...
cold war
,
command
,
communication
,
control
,
emerging technologies
,
NC3
,
NPT
,
nuclear
,
PALS
,
permissive action link
,
stability
,
strategic
May 6, 2019
Report
NC3 in a Multipolar Nuclear World: Big Structures and Large Processes
In this essay, Paul Bracken analyzes the big structures and large processes of nuclear multipolarity. A framework for analyzing this global system is developed, one made up of national command and control plus the "system dynamics" of their interlinked behavior. The paper underscores how advanced technologies — cyberwar, drones, and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) — affects NC3.
anti-satellite
,
cold war
,
command
,
communication
,
control
,
cyberwar
,
drones
,
Europe
,
missile defense
,
NATO
,
NC3
,
Non-Proliferation
,
nuclear
,
stability
,
strategic
,
Strategy
,
weapon
May 14, 2019
Report
A Public, Private War
A 2019 report co-published by the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity and the Institute for Security and Technology (then Technology for Global Security) provides a blueprint for how the U.S. government and private-sector companies can collaborate to prepare for a cyberwar or other massive cyberattack on U.S. interests.
cyber defense
,
cybersecurity
,
Department of Defense
,
Public-private partnerships
July 17, 2019
Report
U.S. Nuclear Command and Control for the 21st Century
Dr. John Harvey calls for fixing the legacy NC2 system, including the so-called “thin line” architecture, to address Cold War-era nuclear scenarios which have not yet gone away, developing an NC2 concept and associated architecture to address “modern” nuclear conflict, and generating a plan to field it over the next 10-15 years.
21st century
,
alert posture
,
cold war
,
command
,
communication
,
conflict
,
control
,
deterrence
,
NC2
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
resilience
,
stability
,
strategic
,
Strategy
,
sustainment
May 23, 2019
Report
Security at Extreme Scales
In Security at Extreme Scales, Eric Grosse argues, "Much of the security progress over the past decade has been at large-scale, finding and patching vulnerabilities in widely used applications or defending networks of millions of machines containing high-value data. The lessons there may help military systems, but for the very highest security needs such as NC3, we ought to return to basics and harden small-scale systems. And we ought to do it as a joint effort, even between adversaries."
complexity
,
control
,
large-scale
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
scale
,
stability
,
users
,
vulnerability
May 30, 2019
Report
France: Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
Benoît Pelopidas outlines what is known about French NC3, reviewing the primacy of presidential nuclear authority, the nuclear chain of command, civilian control over the arsenal, tension between legitimacy and robustness of the chain of command, the role of military authority in the launch order, inadequate code transfer, and accidents and close calls. He concludes: “Beyond the problems of arbitrariness, mismanagement, incidents and accidents outlined above, there are key components of the French nuclear command and control system about which we either do not know much or have partial and conflicting accounts.”
command
,
communication
,
control
,
France
,
key
,
local control
,
NATO
,
nuclear
,
SSL
,
stability
June 13, 2019
Previous
Page
1
Page
2
Page
3
Page
4
Page
5
Next
Search
Search
MENU
HOME PAGE
About
FAQ
The CATALINK Brief
Insights
Events
Analysis
Podcasts
Why crisis communications?
Our Team
GET IN TOUCH
Email:
[email protected]
Send us a message:
Contact
JOIN THE CATALINK MAILING LIST
First Name
Last Name
Organization
Email
Subscribe