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DPRK’s NC3 System

DPRK’s NC3 System

Dr. Myeongguk Cheon describes what is known about North Korea’s NC3 system. Cheon concludes, “Regarding the DPRK’s NC3 system, however, many questions remain unanswered, even though it is clearly identified who has the final approval authority and what forces operates delivery systems for the employment of nuclear weapons.”

artillery, assembly, atomic bomb, authority, autocracy, delegation, delivery system, explosion, fiber-optic, military, NC3, New Year, North Korea, nuclear, South Korea, submarine

June 6, 2019

An Examination of the US NC3 Industrial and Innovation Base

An Examination of the US NC3 Industrial and Innovation Base

Colonel Elvert Gardner examines the U.S. industrial and innovation base, identifying key factors that may militate against innovation and against timely and efficient supply in the US industrial base.

Aquisition, cybersecurity, Department of Defense, DOD, human capital, industrial base, innovation, modernization, National Defense Authorization Act, national security, nuclear, stability, supply chain, United States

June 20, 2019

Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons

Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons

In Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons, Jon Lindsay argues that "offensive cyber operations targeting NC3 introduce a number of under-appreciated risks of organizational breakdown, decision making confusion, and rational miscalculation in a nuclear crisis.”

June 20, 2019

Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems

Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems

Leonid Ryabikhin argues that distrust, misunderstanding and concern prevail in US/NATO and Russia relations, increasing the risk of unintended or accidental conflict. He concludes, "The absence of contacts between the United States and Russian military and the failure to reach new agreements while existing agreements collapse worsens an already dangerous situation."

ballistic missile, biological, early warning, Ministry of Defence, modernization, NC3, nuclear, nuclear forces, radar, reduction, Russia, Soviet Union, stability, submarine, superpower

July 11, 2019

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China

Fiona Cunningham describes the origins of China’s NC3 system and its primary role in supporting China’s land-based missile force. She outlines recent developments including mobility, “informatization” and automation of parts of the NC3 system, pending deployment of nuclear missile submarines, early warning systems, evolving organizational structure, and cultural factors that shape China’s NC3 system and its orientation towards negative versus positive control.

arms race, China, crisis instability, emergency, escalation, modernization, NC3, nuclear, red line, stability

July 18, 2019

An Engineering Perspective on Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War

An Engineering Perspective on Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War

In "An Engineering Perspective on Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War," Nancy Leveson argues that using conservative techniques and avoiding unnecessarily complex software in critical functions in NC3 systems circumvented nuclear catastrophe in the past. She calls for a new approach that avoids gratuitous complexity; emphasizes less, not more technology; and improves NC3 systems.

AI, aircraft, aviation, complexity, human operator, inoperability, interconnection, interdependency, isolation, NC3, nuclear, software, spacecraft, Systems Theory

July 25, 2019

Modulating Trust

Modulating Trust

Social trust – trust in other people and institutions – is critical to the DCDI problem set. But trust is not always beneficial. Although trust in technology can facilitate economic transactions, it can also diminish our capacity for skepticism. Consumers tend to prefer to use technologies that they trust, and sellers and developers of technology find more success when there is more trust in their systems. Yet trust placed too freely in technologies can also generate vulnerabilities for those same consumers–to identity theft, to addiction, to misinformation, and to fraud.

democracy, Geopolitics of Technology, cognition, attention, DCDI, misinformation, trust, fraud, social trust

Exploiting Emotions

Exploiting Emotions

Digital systems exploit and manipulate emotions by design. Emotions prompt people to use digital tools, engage with content, products, and services, respond to advertisements, stay on or return to digital platforms, and even take action offline as a result of online experience. The design of the digital environment, especially its visual nature, also heightens user emotions, often creating an addictive cycle. Because emotions affect how we process, engage with, and often act upon information, they play a central role in the relationship between digital tools and democracy.

democracy, Geopolitics of Technology, cognition, attention, DCDI, memory, reasoning, social, addictive, networks

Rewired: How digital technologies shape cognition and democracy

Rewired: How digital technologies shape cognition and democracy

The Digital Cognition & Democracy Initiative is investigating how digital technologies affect human cognition, and what those effects mean for democracy. Rewired by Leah Walker examines different key themes that have emerged in our DCDI research and working meetings with coalition members. This series is meant to illustrate the depth of the digitally influenced cognition problem, and illuminate how we are thinking about these issues.

democracy, Geopolitics of Technology, cognition, attention, DCDI, memory, reasoning, trust, emotions, critical thinking, friction, information overload

Philip Reiner on Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

In the News, Podcasts

Philip Reiner on Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

Philip Reiner joined Gus Docker, host of the Future of Life Institute podcast, to talk about how nuclear command and control systems work, how they might fail, and what can be done to improve them.

NC3, Innovation and Catastrophic Risk