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Turkey and Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

Report

Turkey and Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

Can Kasapoğlu argues that in contrast to the other four NATO nuclear delivery states, Turkey no longer appears to have an active nuclear weapons delivery mission using bombers and its NC3 system is likely dormant. "Yet," he concludes, "in a hypothetical TNW scenario, the Turkish Air Force would manage the Incirlik base and air traffic for the US air wing, and would probably provide the strike package with fighter escort. In fact, the strong separation between active combat (the US) and support roles (Turkey) could be a complicating factor for the NC3 in real warfighting...
air base, Ankara, C4ISR, cold war, Middle East, missile, NATO, NC3, nuclear, nuclear delivery state, squadron, stability, Turkey, United States
June 27, 2019
DPRK’s NC3 System

Report

DPRK’s NC3 System

Dr. Myeongguk Cheon describes what is known about North Korea’s NC3 system. Cheon concludes, “Regarding the DPRK’s NC3 system, however, many questions remain unanswered, even though it is clearly identified who has the final approval authority and what forces operates delivery systems for the employment of nuclear weapons.”
artillery, assembly, atomic bomb, authority, autocracy, delegation, delivery system, explosion, fiber-optic, military, NC3, New Year, North Korea, nuclear, South Korea, submarine
June 6, 2019
An Examination of the US NC3 Industrial and Innovation Base

Report

An Examination of the US NC3 Industrial and Innovation Base

Colonel Elvert Gardner examines the U.S. industrial and innovation base, identifying key factors that may militate against innovation and against timely and efficient supply in the US industrial base.
Aquisition, cybersecurity, Department of Defense, DOD, human capital, industrial base, innovation, modernization, National Defense Authorization Act, national security, nuclear, stability, supply chain, United States
June 20, 2019
Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons

Report

Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons

In Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons, Jon Lindsay argues that "offensive cyber operations targeting NC3 introduce a number of under-appreciated risks of organizational breakdown, decision making confusion, and rational miscalculation in a nuclear crisis.”
accidental launch, arms control, attack vector, complexity, computer, control, counterattack, counterintelligence, countermeasure, crisis, crytographic, cyber, digital, electronic warfare, escalation, NC3, reconnaissance, redundant, retaliation, software, stability, Stuxnet, supercomputer
June 20, 2019
Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems

Report

Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems

Leonid Ryabikhin argues that distrust, misunderstanding and concern prevail in US/NATO and Russia relations, increasing the risk of unintended or accidental conflict. He concludes, "The absence of contacts between the United States and Russian military and the failure to reach new agreements while existing agreements collapse worsens an already dangerous situation."
ballistic missile, biological, early warning, Ministry of Defence, modernization, NC3, nuclear, nuclear forces, radar, reduction, Russia, Soviet Union, stability, submarine, superpower
July 11, 2019
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China

Report

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China

Fiona Cunningham describes the origins of China’s NC3 system and its primary role in supporting China’s land-based missile force. She outlines recent developments including mobility, “informatization” and automation of parts of the NC3 system, pending deployment of nuclear missile submarines, early warning systems, evolving organizational structure, and cultural factors that shape China’s NC3 system and its orientation towards negative versus positive control.
arms race, China, crisis instability, emergency, escalation, modernization, NC3, nuclear, red line, stability
July 18, 2019
Attention: How digital technologies influence what we notice, what we focus on, and how we learn

Report

Attention: How digital technologies influence what we notice, what we focus on, and how we learn

This report examines the impact that technology has on the cognitive function of attention. It provides a working definition of attention within a cognitive science context, including the distinction between overt and covert attention. It summarizes findings that elucidate how attention is affected by the passive and active consumption of technology.
Memory: How digital technologies influence cognitive information storage

Report

Memory: How digital technologies influence cognitive information storage

Memory is foundational to cognition. It enables individuals to operate with certain assumptions about truth based on prior validated beliefs. Memory informs individual decision making, reasoning, and problem solving. There are also significant societal implications rooted in memory function. Individual memories, collectively and cumulatively, inform the development of “national memory,” which in turn influences “the construction of a democratic culture and collective identity.” This report provides a working definition of memory and focuses especially on long-term memory.
Shortcutting Critical Thinking

Report

Shortcutting Critical Thinking

The scale, accuracy, and speed of digital technologies make them particularly effective at activating the very emotions that influence and undermine critical thinking. Not only do digital technologies have the ability to inflame those emotions, but they often are designed to do so, as those very emotions drive engagement, use, and consumer spending.
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