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AI and NC3
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2019
Op-ed
The Real Value of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command and Control
In an article in War on the Rocks, Philip Reiner and Alexa Wehsener make the case for a nuanced discussion about the integration of artificial intelligence in nuclear command, control, and communication systems.
artificial intelligence
,
machine learning
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
stability
November 4, 2019
AAR
,
Report
NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability: A Global Overview
In a conventional conflict between the United States and China or Russia, each belligerent might attack the other's command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities to gain a war-fighting advantage. However, because a number of...
cold war
,
command
,
communication
,
control
,
emerging technologies
,
NC3
,
NPT
,
nuclear
,
PALS
,
permissive action link
,
stability
,
strategic
May 6, 2019
Report
NC3 in a Multipolar Nuclear World: Big Structures and Large Processes
In this essay, Paul Bracken analyzes the big structures and large processes of nuclear multipolarity. A framework for analyzing this global system is developed, one made up of national command and control plus the "system dynamics" of their interlinked behavior. The paper underscores how advanced technologies — cyberwar, drones, and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) — affects NC3.
anti-satellite
,
cold war
,
command
,
communication
,
control
,
cyberwar
,
drones
,
Europe
,
missile defense
,
NATO
,
NC3
,
Non-Proliferation
,
nuclear
,
stability
,
strategic
,
Strategy
,
weapon
May 14, 2019
Report
A Public, Private War
A 2019 report co-published by the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity and the Institute for Security and Technology (then Technology for Global Security) provides a blueprint for how the U.S. government and private-sector companies can collaborate to prepare for a cyberwar or other massive cyberattack on U.S. interests.
cyber defense
,
cybersecurity
,
Department of Defense
,
Public-private partnerships
July 17, 2019
Report
U.S. Nuclear Command and Control for the 21st Century
Dr. John Harvey calls for fixing the legacy NC2 system, including the so-called “thin line” architecture, to address Cold War-era nuclear scenarios which have not yet gone away, developing an NC2 concept and associated architecture to address “modern” nuclear conflict, and generating a plan to field it over the next 10-15 years.
21st century
,
alert posture
,
cold war
,
command
,
communication
,
conflict
,
control
,
deterrence
,
NC2
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
resilience
,
stability
,
strategic
,
Strategy
,
sustainment
May 23, 2019
Report
Security at Extreme Scales
In Security at Extreme Scales, Eric Grosse argues, "Much of the security progress over the past decade has been at large-scale, finding and patching vulnerabilities in widely used applications or defending networks of millions of machines containing high-value data. The lessons there may help military systems, but for the very highest security needs such as NC3, we ought to return to basics and harden small-scale systems. And we ought to do it as a joint effort, even between adversaries."
complexity
,
control
,
large-scale
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
scale
,
stability
,
users
,
vulnerability
May 30, 2019
Report
France: Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
Benoît Pelopidas outlines what is known about French NC3, reviewing the primacy of presidential nuclear authority, the nuclear chain of command, civilian control over the arsenal, tension between legitimacy and robustness of the chain of command, the role of military authority in the launch order, inadequate code transfer, and accidents and close calls. He concludes: “Beyond the problems of arbitrariness, mismanagement, incidents and accidents outlined above, there are key components of the French nuclear command and control system about which we either do not know much or have partial and conflicting accounts.”
command
,
communication
,
control
,
France
,
key
,
local control
,
NATO
,
nuclear
,
SSL
,
stability
June 13, 2019
Report
Turkey and Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
Can Kasapoğlu argues that in contrast to the other four NATO nuclear delivery states, Turkey no longer appears to have an active nuclear weapons delivery mission using bombers and its NC3 system is likely dormant. "Yet," he concludes, "in a hypothetical TNW scenario, the Turkish Air Force would manage the Incirlik base and air traffic for the US air wing, and would probably provide the strike package with fighter escort. In fact, the strong separation between active combat (the US) and support roles (Turkey) could be a complicating factor for the NC3 in real warfighting...
air base
,
Ankara
,
C4ISR
,
cold war
,
Middle East
,
missile
,
NATO
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear delivery state
,
squadron
,
stability
,
Turkey
,
United States
June 27, 2019
Report
DPRK’s NC3 System
Dr. Myeongguk Cheon describes what is known about North Korea’s NC3 system. Cheon concludes, “Regarding the DPRK’s NC3 system, however, many questions remain unanswered, even though it is clearly identified who has the final approval authority and what forces operates delivery systems for the employment of nuclear weapons.”
artillery
,
assembly
,
atomic bomb
,
authority
,
autocracy
,
delegation
,
delivery system
,
explosion
,
fiber-optic
,
military
,
NC3
,
New Year
,
North Korea
,
nuclear
,
South Korea
,
submarine
June 6, 2019
Report
An Examination of the US NC3 Industrial and Innovation Base
Colonel Elvert Gardner examines the U.S. industrial and innovation base, identifying key factors that may militate against innovation and against timely and efficient supply in the US industrial base.
Aquisition
,
cybersecurity
,
Department of Defense
,
DOD
,
human capital
,
industrial base
,
innovation
,
modernization
,
National Defense Authorization Act
,
national security
,
nuclear
,
stability
,
supply chain
,
United States
June 20, 2019
Report
Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons
In Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons, Jon Lindsay argues that "offensive cyber operations targeting NC3 introduce a number of under-appreciated risks of organizational breakdown, decision making confusion, and rational miscalculation in a nuclear crisis.”
accidental launch
,
arms control
,
attack vector
,
complexity
,
computer
,
control
,
counterattack
,
counterintelligence
,
countermeasure
,
crisis
,
crytographic
,
cyber
,
digital
,
electronic warfare
,
escalation
,
NC3
,
reconnaissance
,
redundant
,
retaliation
,
software
,
stability
,
Stuxnet
,
supercomputer
June 20, 2019
Report
Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems
Leonid Ryabikhin argues that distrust, misunderstanding and concern prevail in US/NATO and Russia relations, increasing the risk of unintended or accidental conflict. He concludes, "The absence of contacts between the United States and Russian military and the failure to reach new agreements while existing agreements collapse worsens an already dangerous situation."
ballistic missile
,
biological
,
early warning
,
Ministry of Defence
,
modernization
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear forces
,
radar
,
reduction
,
Russia
,
Soviet Union
,
stability
,
submarine
,
superpower
July 11, 2019
Report
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China
Fiona Cunningham describes the origins of China’s NC3 system and its primary role in supporting China’s land-based missile force. She outlines recent developments including mobility, “informatization” and automation of parts of the NC3 system, pending deployment of nuclear missile submarines, early warning systems, evolving organizational structure, and cultural factors that shape China’s NC3 system and its orientation towards negative versus positive control.
arms race
,
China
,
crisis instability
,
emergency
,
escalation
,
modernization
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
red line
,
stability
July 18, 2019
Report
An Engineering Perspective on Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War
In "An Engineering Perspective on Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War," Nancy Leveson argues that using conservative techniques and avoiding unnecessarily complex software in critical functions in NC3 systems circumvented nuclear catastrophe in the past. She calls for a new approach that avoids gratuitous complexity; emphasizes less, not more technology; and improves NC3 systems.
AI
,
aircraft
,
aviation
,
complexity
,
human operator
,
inoperability
,
interconnection
,
interdependency
,
isolation
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
software
,
spacecraft
,
Systems Theory
July 25, 2019
Report
Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India
M.V. Ramana and Lauren Borja analyze the state of nuclear command and control in India, concluding that the state of Indian NC3 “has been shaped by an ongoing rivalry between civilian authorities and the military."
accident
,
communication
,
control
,
decision-making
,
defense
,
delivery vehicle
,
deterrence
,
early warning
,
India
,
military
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
Pakistan
,
stability
,
submarine
,
survivability
,
United States
,
wargaming
August 1, 2019
Report
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: U.S. Country Profile
In "Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: U.S. Country Profile," Jeffrey Larsen argues that, for the last 75 years, the deterrence forces of the United States have relied on the credible threat of nuclear weapons use to prevent adversarial attacks.
authority
,
C2
,
command
,
communication
,
control
,
deterrence
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
policy
,
president
,
stability
,
strategic
,
Strategy
,
United States
,
US
,
World War II
August 22, 2019
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