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AI and NC3
Pioneering action-oriented efforts to explore how advanced AI capabilities will be integrated into nuclear command, control, and communications
AI Antitrust and National Security
Exploring how to more effectively account for national security considerations in AI antitrust cases while respecting precedent, scope, and the core principles of antitrust law
AI Risk Reduction Initiative
Assessing the emerging risks and opportunities of AI foundation models and developing risk reduction strategies
AI Chip Export Control Initiative
Safeguarding U.S. national competitiveness by closing critical compliance and enforcement gaps
AI Risk Barometer
Measuring national security professionals’ perceptions of AI futures through a technically-informed survey
CATALINK
Preventing the onset or escalation of conflict by building a resilient global communications system
Energy FIRST
Powering U.S. and allied security & prosperity through a resilient energy future
Ransomware Task Force (RTF)
Combating the ransomware threat with a cross-sector approach
Religious Voices and Responsible AI
Engaging religious communities on safe and beneficial AI
SL5 Task Force
Strengthening AI security through a multistakeholder approach
UnDisruptable27
Driving more resilient lifeline critical infrastructure for our communities
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communication
Report
Hotline Between Two Koreas: Status, Limitations and Future Tasks
In this paper, Moon Chung-in and Boo Seung-Chan provide historical context on the hotlines linking South and North Korea and point to the lessons that can be learned from the decades-long effort.
CATALINK
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communication
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communication link
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crisis
,
crisis management
,
escalation
,
history
,
hotlines
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Innovation and Catastrophic Risk
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear security
,
nuclear weapon
,
nuclear weapon states
,
nuclear weapons
,
nuclear-use
,
secure communications
December 17, 2020
Report
Building Communications Norms Across Nuclear C2
Dr. Salma Shaheen stresses the importance of establishing new norms, constructing new practices, and securing reliant communications between nuclear-armed states before a potential crisis. Shaheen reaffirms the need for a direct communication link between global leaders to facilitate quick and efficient communications between nuclear-armed states — a capability she cites as essential for escalation control and nuclear weapons reduction, with a direct impact on crisis aversion and thus global security.
CATALINK
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communication
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control
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crisis
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crisis management
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escalation
,
history
,
hotlines
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear security
,
nuclear weapon
,
nuclear-use
,
secure communications
November 24, 2020
Report
Formal Methods for NC3 Systems
What if we told you there is a very concrete way of updating and securing the most complex NC3 systems? Adam Wick makes the case for future NC3 protocol descriptions "to include not only a broad description of the protocol and its goals, but also an executable specification of the protocol. He continues, "Given the sensitivity of these systems, we believe that the use of proof is critical."
communication
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control
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crisis management
,
formal methods
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mathematics
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NC3
,
nuclear
,
nuclear security
,
nuclear weapons
,
nuclear-use
September 17, 2020
Podcast
Wake-Up Call
In the first episode of The Fourth Leg's season 2, we discuss the need for a better communication system between nuclear powers with Philip Reiner, Peter Hayes, Eric Grosse, Rear Admiral John Gower, and Subrata Banik.
communication
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complexity
,
crisis communications
,
nuclear communications
,
nuclear crisis communications
May 13, 2020
Report
Communication Disruption Attacks on NC3
In an essay out of the workshop "Last Chance: Communicating at the Nuclear Brink," Paul Bracken argues, "in a nuclear world we should be careful about attacking enemy communications because doing so leads to greater risks of uncontrolled escalation. The worst possible situation is the one the United States is now in, that is, to not be clear in our own minds about what we are doing when it comes to disrupting communications.”
CATALINK
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communication
,
communication attacks
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electromagnetic pulse
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electronic warfare
,
escalation
,
military
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
red line
,
retaliation
,
strike
,
target
,
targeting
,
United States
,
vulnerability
May 28, 2020
AAR
,
Report
NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability: A Global Overview
In a conventional conflict between the United States and China or Russia, each belligerent might attack the other's command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities to gain a war-fighting advantage. However, because a number of...
cold war
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command
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communication
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control
,
emerging technologies
,
NC3
,
NPT
,
nuclear
,
PALS
,
permissive action link
,
stability
,
strategic
May 6, 2019
Report
NC3 in a Multipolar Nuclear World: Big Structures and Large Processes
In this essay, Paul Bracken analyzes the big structures and large processes of nuclear multipolarity. A framework for analyzing this global system is developed, one made up of national command and control plus the "system dynamics" of their interlinked behavior. The paper underscores how advanced technologies — cyberwar, drones, and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) — affects NC3.
anti-satellite
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cold war
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command
,
communication
,
control
,
cyberwar
,
drones
,
Europe
,
missile defense
,
NATO
,
NC3
,
Non-Proliferation
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nuclear
,
stability
,
strategic
,
Strategy
,
weapon
May 14, 2019
Report
U.S. Nuclear Command and Control for the 21st Century
Dr. John Harvey calls for fixing the legacy NC2 system, including the so-called “thin line” architecture, to address Cold War-era nuclear scenarios which have not yet gone away, developing an NC2 concept and associated architecture to address “modern” nuclear conflict, and generating a plan to field it over the next 10-15 years.
21st century
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alert posture
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cold war
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command
,
communication
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conflict
,
control
,
deterrence
,
NC2
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
resilience
,
stability
,
strategic
,
Strategy
,
sustainment
May 23, 2019
Report
France: Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
Benoît Pelopidas outlines what is known about French NC3, reviewing the primacy of presidential nuclear authority, the nuclear chain of command, civilian control over the arsenal, tension between legitimacy and robustness of the chain of command, the role of military authority in the launch order, inadequate code transfer, and accidents and close calls. He concludes: “Beyond the problems of arbitrariness, mismanagement, incidents and accidents outlined above, there are key components of the French nuclear command and control system about which we either do not know much or have partial and conflicting accounts.”
command
,
communication
,
control
,
France
,
key
,
local control
,
NATO
,
nuclear
,
SSL
,
stability
June 13, 2019
Report
Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India
M.V. Ramana and Lauren Borja analyze the state of nuclear command and control in India, concluding that the state of Indian NC3 “has been shaped by an ongoing rivalry between civilian authorities and the military."
accident
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communication
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control
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decision-making
,
defense
,
delivery vehicle
,
deterrence
,
early warning
,
India
,
military
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
Pakistan
,
stability
,
submarine
,
survivability
,
United States
,
wargaming
August 1, 2019
Report
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: U.S. Country Profile
In "Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: U.S. Country Profile," Jeffrey Larsen argues that, for the last 75 years, the deterrence forces of the United States have relied on the credible threat of nuclear weapons use to prevent adversarial attacks.
authority
,
C2
,
command
,
communication
,
control
,
deterrence
,
NC3
,
nuclear
,
policy
,
president
,
stability
,
strategic
,
Strategy
,
United States
,
US
,
World War II
August 22, 2019
Report
Counter Nuclear Command, Control and Communications
This report by Carol Ann Jones seeks to introduce the nuclear command, control, and stability framework; collect open source NC3 system information on the eight declared nuclear nations to fill in the framework; describe counter NC3 activities; and introduce a few alternate NC3 approaches that may contribute to nuclear stability.
anti-satellite
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bias
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C3
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command and control
,
communication
,
complexity
,
electromagnetic pulse
,
launch authority
,
modernization
,
NC3
,
Nuclear Posture Review
,
special operation
,
stability
,
strike
,
supply chain
,
threshold
,
vulnerability
,
warhead
,
warning
November 7, 2019
Report
Cities, Social Media, and Preparedness for Major Threats
Sunil Dubey lays out six principles for safer cities to become better prepared for threats propagated by social media.
cities
,
communication
,
population
,
social media
,
urbanization
November 15, 2018
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