Archive

NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability

Outlining the global effects of nuclear modernization and advanced technologies

Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons

Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons

In Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons, Jon Lindsay argues that "offensive cyber operations targeting NC3 introduce a number of under-appreciated risks of organizational breakdown, decision making confusion, and rational miscalculation in a nuclear crisis.”

June 20, 2019

Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems

Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems

Leonid Ryabikhin argues that distrust, misunderstanding and concern prevail in US/NATO and Russia relations, increasing the risk of unintended or accidental conflict. He concludes, "The absence of contacts between the United States and Russian military and the failure to reach new agreements while existing agreements collapse worsens an already dangerous situation."

ballistic missile, biological, early warning, Ministry of Defence, modernization, NC3, nuclear, nuclear forces, radar, reduction, Russia, Soviet Union, stability, submarine, superpower

July 11, 2019

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic of China

Fiona Cunningham describes the origins of China’s NC3 system and its primary role in supporting China’s land-based missile force. She outlines recent developments including mobility, “informatization” and automation of parts of the NC3 system, pending deployment of nuclear missile submarines, early warning systems, evolving organizational structure, and cultural factors that shape China’s NC3 system and its orientation towards negative versus positive control.

arms race, China, crisis instability, emergency, escalation, modernization, NC3, nuclear, red line, stability

July 18, 2019

An Engineering Perspective on Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War

An Engineering Perspective on Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War

In "An Engineering Perspective on Avoiding Inadvertent Nuclear War," Nancy Leveson argues that using conservative techniques and avoiding unnecessarily complex software in critical functions in NC3 systems circumvented nuclear catastrophe in the past. She calls for a new approach that avoids gratuitous complexity; emphasizes less, not more technology; and improves NC3 systems.

AI, aircraft, aviation, complexity, human operator, inoperability, interconnection, interdependency, isolation, NC3, nuclear, software, spacecraft, Systems Theory

July 25, 2019

Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India

Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India

M.V. Ramana and Lauren Borja analyze the state of nuclear command and control in India, concluding that the state of Indian NC3 “has been shaped by an ongoing rivalry between civilian authorities and the military."

accident, communication, control, decision-making, defense, delivery vehicle, deterrence, early warning, India, military, NC3, nuclear, Pakistan, stability, submarine, survivability, United States, wargaming

August 1, 2019

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: U.S. Country Profile

In "Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: U.S. Country Profile," Jeffrey Larsen argues that, for the last 75 years, the deterrence forces of the United States have relied on the credible threat of nuclear weapons use to prevent adversarial attacks.

authority, C2, command, communication, control, deterrence, NC3, nuclear, policy, president, stability, strategic, Strategy, United States, US, World War II

August 22, 2019

The Non-State Dimensions of Nuclear Command, Control, Communications

The Non-State Dimensions of Nuclear Command, Control, Communications

Dr. Gary Ackerman introduces how violent non-state actors (VSNAs) may approach the command and control of nuclear weapons and suggests that understanding the complexity presented by VNSA NC3 entails considering traditional concepts of state NC3 and dynamics that are unique to non-state actors driven by a variety of goals and confronting a different set of constraints from those of states.

August 29, 2019

NC3 Decision Making: Individual Versus Group Process

NC3 Decision Making: Individual Versus Group Process

Dr. Alex Wallerstein sketches a framework for thinking about how concentrated nuclear use authority should be at the top. While he discusses specific U.S. proposals for reform in response to recent domestic debates, the scope of his analysis is uniquely global and includes a comparative analysis of the approach of all nine nuclear weapons states.

civil-military, cold war, congress, Constitution, deterrence, enrichment, migration, NC3, nuclear codes, Senate, stability, status quo, STRATCOM, Strategy, UK

August 8, 2019

Emerging Technologies, Emerging Challenges: The Potential Employment of New Technologies in Future PLA NC3

Emerging Technologies, Emerging Challenges: The Potential Employment of New Technologies in Future PLA NC3

Elsa Kania assesses how emerging technologies—including artificial intelligence, cloud computing, fifth-generation telecommunications, and quantum communications—may affect China’s NC3. Kania concludes: “Although certain of these technologies could enhance China’s confidence in its NC3 in ways that may prove stabilizing, there are also reasons for concern that the potential introduction of such complex, untested technologies could also create new risks and exacerbate the threat of miscalculation.”

September 5, 2019

United Kingdom: Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, and Communications

United Kingdom: Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, and Communications

Rear Admiral John Gower argues that the UK Nuclear Weapon Command Control and Communications (UK NC3) architecture is designed and operated to support SSBN strategic nuclear deterrence in all foreseeable circumstances from peacetime to nuclear conflict. "Through multiple paths and frequencies, fall-back and alternative systems, and with dedicated and unique encryption and processes, it delivers continuous availability for the Prime Minister should a decision to launch be made," he says.

August 15, 2019

Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3): The Case of Pakistan

Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3): The Case of Pakistan

Author Feroz Khan illustrates the unique challenges facing Pakistan's NC3 systems. When considering the rapid pace of technological advancements, Khan concludes, "as NC3 gains sophistication, control of partial or full pre-delegation regimes would likely be refined to overcome the never/always dilemma of deployed arsenals in the field."

delegation, India, military, nuclear, nuclear arsenal, Pakistan, stability

September 26, 2019

Innovation and Adaptive Control in America’s Electric Infrastructure: Parallels to NC3

Innovation and Adaptive Control in America’s Electric Infrastructure: Parallels to NC3

Providing unique insights into the performance of highly complex command and control systems from a radically different perspective, Mason Willrich describes how each of the major components of electricity infrastructure is interconnected and interactive with the others. How can this be illustrative for thinking about the challenges - and solutions - for nuclear command and control?

October 3, 2019

Israel’s NC3 Profile: Opaque Nuclear Governance

In this essay, Avner Cohen traces and exposes Israel’s two most fundamental principles of the Israeli NC3 thinking: first, insisting on a strict physical and organizational separation between nuclear and non-nuclear assets, and second, its two-tier governance architecture.

architecture, Israel, Middle East, national security, NC3, NPT, nuclear, nuclear program, stability

October 10, 2019

NC3 and Crisis Instability: Growing Dangers in the 21st Century

NC3 and Crisis Instability: Growing Dangers in the 21st Century

Daryl Press focuses on the growing threats to nuclear command and control and communication (NC3) systems around the world and the links between vulnerable NC3 and strategic instability due to the risky steps that nuclear weapons states may adopt to protect their arsenals during crises or wars.

October 17, 2019

A New Framework for Thinking about Regional NC3

A New Framework for Thinking about Regional NC3

“All states delegate—that is, cede the ability to use nuclear weapons, irrespective of the authority to do so—at some point. The question is when," concludes Vipin Narang.

assured retaliation, ballistic missiles, civil-military, deterrent, fog of war, information environment, No First Use, nuclear, permissive action link, personnel procedures, positive control, redundant, reliability, stability, strategic, submarine

September 19, 2019

What Do We Want From the Nuclear Command and Control System?

What Do We Want From the Nuclear Command and Control System?

In this essay from IST and the Nautilus Institute, Paul Davis suggests that U.S. NC3 modernization “should place increased emphasis on assuring control, avoiding accidents, and avoiding ill-informed or unwise employment of nuclear weapons.”

authorization, deterrence, first strike, intelligence, launch under attack, limited war, modernization, NC3, nuclear policy, redundancy, retaliation, stability, strategic, warfighting, zero-tolerance

October 24, 2019